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Over the summer months, the crisis has reached 
new levels of seriousness and urgency as 
dangerous feedback loops between sovereign 
risks, banking sector health and the wider 
economy have re-emerged. The weakening of 
business and consumer confidence in recent 
months across the euro area should be seen as a 
cautionary development. Not only does it 
suggest a weakening of the current business 
cycle position, but it also places the sovereign 
debt crisis in a more challenging environment 
marked by greater risk aversion and uncertainty. 
Projections from the Commission's latest interim 
forecasts, published on September 15, show 
slower growth in the second half of this year 
than expected at the time of the spring forecasts. 
Downside risks to growth prospects have 
increased, primarily due to concerns about the 
unresolved euro-area crisis and its repercussions 
on financial markets' health as well as the global 
economic slowdown. 
These developments underscore the need for 
determined policy action. The implementation of 
the comprehensive crisis resolution agreements 
reached at the Euro Area Summit on 21 July 
2011 is key in this respect. The EFSF will play a 
central role here, and its resources will need to 
be optimised and greater flexibility ensured. 
Once the new EFSF is ratified, efficient use of 
its financial envelope must be made, and the 
Commission is working on options to this end.  
Europe can act in a resolute and timely manner 
to adopt bold measures. The agreement reached 
between the European Parliament and the 
Council on 4 October on the six legislative 
proposals on strengthening economic 
governance in the EU, also known as the 'six-
pack', bears witness to this. Nevertheless, the 
scale and nature of the crisis demands that we go 
further in our response. The Commission will 
therefore build on the six-pack and soon present 
a proposal for a single, coherent framework to 
deepen economic governance, particularly in the 
euro area. Continued cooperation between 
Member States and European institutions is of 
utmost importance so as to bolster confidence in 
the euro-area's ability to weather the crisis. 
With sovereign debt being one of the main 
issues at the heart of the crisis, the current 
edition has made public debt dynamics its main 
theme. In a focus section an overview of the debt 
situation is given in both short and medium-term 
perspectives. Not only do the higher debt levels 
following the crisis require higher primary 
surpluses to cover the additional interest 
payments, but debt can also act as a brake on 
growth. Given the additional difficulties 
presented by an ageing population, the outlook 
for the medium term is challenging. The focus 
shows that setting public finances on a 
sustainable path will require significant 
consolidation measures – over and above those 
already introduced – in a number of euro-area 
Member States. Nevertheless, the responses 
required are not unprecedented, and responding 
in a timely manner can both reduce the total 
effort required and ensure that the euro-area 
economies benefit as soon as possible from the 
positive impact of debt reduction on growth. The 
section also presents instruments to assess the 
risk of fiscal crises that should help 
policymakers to act timely in the face of future 
adverse shocks.  
While fiscal imbalances are clearly at the 
forefront of the current policy debate, they are 
by no means the only instance of relevant 
economic imbalances. Macroeconomic 
adjustment will also be necessary in areas that 
evade direct policy control and where 
rebalancing will be market-based, for instance in 
the case of large external deficits. But, as a 
number of contributions in this edition show, 
structural policies can play an important 
enabling role also in market-based adjustment 
processes. Hence, a number of measures can 
used to make the rebalancing of a large external 
deficits more growth friendly. Theses include 
policies that emulate the effects of a nominal 
exchange rate depreciation such as a shift in the 
burden of taxation away from labour. Measures 
facilitating the required adaptation on the supply 
side – e.g. in terms of resource reallocation to 
the export sector – also have a role to play. 
Structural policies can also help reducing the 
occurrence of costly imbalances. Appropriate 
housing taxation and regulation can contribute to 
curb excessive house price volatility while 
moving to lower levels of product market 
regulation (PMR) can improve the economy's 
resilience to shocks.  
Looking into more details into these findings, 
our first special topic on internal devaluation 
shows how specific policy measures can support 
external rebalancing through relative 
competitiveness changes. Various kinds of 
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'internal devaluation' can mimic the effects of 
nominal devaluations by reducing domestic 
prices and encouraging expenditure-switching. 
The section looks at two potential measures of 
internal devaluation and assesses their 
effectiveness using the Commission's macro-
economic model QUEST. The simulations show 
that tax reforms aiming at a shift of the burden 
of taxation from labour to consumption can raise 
employment, boost GDP and improve the net 
foreign asset position. Alternatively, and bearing 
in mind that public-sector wages grew faster 
than in the private sector in many Member States 
in pre-crisis years, public sector wage discipline 
can spill over to private sector wages. This 
should reduce production costs and improve 
competiveness in addition to the policy's direct 
budgetary impact. However, similarly to 
nominal exchange rate adjustments, internal 
devaluations are unlikely to have permanent 
trade balance effects if real labour costs are not 
permanently affected or if increasing domestic 
demand leads to a rise in imports. 
Secondly, a special topic is dedicated to the 
mechanics of external rebalancing from a 
supply-side perspective. As the pre-crisis decade 
witnessed a growing sectoral skew towards non-
tradable production (primarily housing and 
services) in a number of Member States running 
high external deficits, the associated changes in 
prices and shifts in resources will have to be 
eventually unwound. If prices adjust 
insufficiently or if resources are not reallocated 
properly, the rebalancing of the current account 
will be associated with a persistent rise in 
unemployment. The section concludes that the 
more integrated the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors are and the more easily resources move 
across sectors, the smaller the required price 
adjustment for the current account to close 
without leaving excess supply. 
A further special topic investigates the euro-area 
Member States' resilience to shocks by analysing 
differences in the adjustment capacity of 
industrial sectors to common output shocks. 
Some structural characteristics of the economy 
are found to play an important role. In particular, 
high levels of product market regulation (PMR) 
have a negative impact on resilience. These 
results suggest that reducing PMR would help 
improve Member States' overall cyclical 
resilience and thereby improve the cross-country 
synchronisation of the business cycle.  
A final section is dedicated to the analysis of key 
structural features of housing markets, which in 
themselves have potentially important impact on 
economic and financial stability. The analysis 
suggests that policies aimed at encouraging 
housing ownership, especially for the low 
income population, may also have a negative 
impact on house price stability. In addition, 
variable mortgage interest rates, high loan-to-
value ratios as well as tax incentives for house 
purchase appear to increase the risk of housing 
market imbalances. Both for social policy and 
macroeconomic stability, close monitoring of 
housing markets is therefore warranted. 
The crisis is forcing considerable 
macroeconomic adjustment on many economies 
in the world. Swift and direct action is required 
in the area of public debt reduction, as well as in 
promoting external rebalancing so as to avoid 
large external debt build-ups. In the longer term, 
economies will need to be made more 
economically resilient, including through 
changes in product, capital and labour markets. 
Neither the challenges nor the tools of economic 
policy are genuinely new, but their importance 
has rarely been greater. 
 
MARCO BUTI 
DIRECTOR-GENERAL 
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I. Debt dynamics and sustainability in the euro area 
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The economic and financial crisis has led to a marked increase in government debt in the euro area countries. 
While the magnitude of the increase is in line with that resulting from other financial crises, its cumulative 
effect is greater and brings the question of the medium-term sustainability of public finances to the fore. Not 
only does higher debt require higher primary surpluses to cover the additional interest payments but it can act 
as a brake on growth. Given the additional difficulties presented by an ageing population, the outlook for the 
medium term is challenging. This focus section presents an overview of the debt situation both currently and 
through medium-term projections. It shows that setting public finances on a sustainable path will require 
significant consolidation measures — over and above those already introduced — in a number of euro area 
Member States. In some of them, the primary balance required to bring debt back to a sustainable level is 
particularly high by historical standards. Nevertheless, the responses required are not unprecedented, and 
responding in a timely manner can both reduce the total effort required and ensure that the European 
economies benefit as soon as possible from the positive impact that debt reduction has on growth. The section 
also presents instruments for assessing the risk of fiscal crises that should help policymakers to take early 
action in the event of additional shocks emerging with adverse effects on sustainability. 
I.1. Recent debt developments in the euro 
area 
The global economic crisis has led to rises in debt 
in all euro area countries due to a combination of 
higher fiscal deficits and support measures in 
favour of the banking sector. While the magnitude 
of the debt increases varies considerably across 
countries, it is significant enough overall to bring 
the issue of the medium and long-term 
sustainability of public finances to the fore. For 
some countries, the effect of the crisis has been so 
severe that markets have priced the possibility of 
sovereign default into bond prices, reflecting the 
threat of insolvency or illiquidity for the first time 
since the launch of EMU. 
Graph I.1: Government debt, euro area  
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Source: Commission services. 
Graph I.1 shows the overall level of debt in the 
euro area from 2002 to 2012. While debt stood at 
66.2 % of GDP in 2007, the year before the Great 
Recession, the Commission services’ most recent 
forecast expects it to rise to 87.7% of GDP in 
2011, with a further increase to 88.5 % of GDP in 
2012. (1) An increase of around 20 pp of GDP is 
in line with experiences of past financial crises.  
Graph I.2: Government debt after financial 
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(1) Non-weighted country averages unless otherwise specified. 
(2) Weighted average, t0 = 2007. (2) Financial crisis episodes in 
EU27 countries (CZ, FI, HU, LV, PL, SK, ES, SE). (3) Financial 
crisis episodes in EU15 countries (FI, ES, SE). (4) Financial 
crisis episodes in FI, NO, SE, JP and ES. 
Source: Commission services on the basis of IMF and 
AMECO data. 
Graph I.2 shows similar increases in debt during 
past episodes of financial crises in EU countries 
and other advanced economies. In particular, a 
number of European countries experienced 
significant increases in their debt levels in the 
aftermath of the oil shocks of the 1970s and 
1980s, while similar increases in the level of debt 
resulted from the banking crises of Sweden and 
                                                        
(1) European Commission (2011), ‘European economic forecast 
– Spring 2011’, European Economy Vol 1. September 2011  
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Finland in the 1990s. While today’s situation is 
broadly in line with the experience of past crises, 
the one significant difference is that the current 
starting level of debt is higher.  
Within the overall total, moreover, there is large 
variation across countries. Graph I.3 shows the 
debt level in all euro area countries in both 2007 
and 2012, the latter as predicted by the 
Commission services in the spring 2011 forecasts. 
It shows that while some countries such as 
Estonia, Cyprus and Malta are likely to see very 
modest rises in their debt, Spain and Portugal are 
expected to experience increases of above 30 pp 
of GDP and Greece and Ireland of over 60 and 
90 pp respectively.  
The euro area is not alone in experiencing large 
increases in debt as a result of the current crisis. 
Indeed, the debt increases seen so far and forecast 
for the next year in both the USA and Japan are 
larger. From a starting level of 62.3 % of GDP in 
2007, debt in the USA is forecast, by the 
Commission, to reach 102.4 % of GDP by 2012, 
with the respective figures for Japan being 
167.0 % in 2007 to 215.9 % by 2012. The rise in 
debt in these leading economies measured in 
percentage points of GDP is higher than for any 
euro area country except Greece and shows that 
this is a problem not restricted to the euro area. 
Graph I.3: Debt in 2007 and 2012, euro area 
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Source: Commission services. 
The increases in debt are a serious concern for 
policymakers. High debt brings into question the 
sustainability of an economy, where sustainability 
relates to the ability of a government to service its 
debt over the long term. Not only is high debt 
more costly to service as it requires higher interest 
payments to be made, but its secondary effects 
also create difficulties. Once it passes a certain 
threshold, there is evidence that debt has a 
negative effect on economic growth, while the 
perceived risk associated with high debt levels can 
lead to increases in the interest rate payable on 
new debt. (2) Thus interest payments rise not just 
because of the volume of the debt, but also 
because the cost of borrowing has risen. 
Moreover, the higher taxes required to service the 
debt will act as a brake on growth. It is clear that 
there is considerable variation within the euro area 
as to the extent that these issues affect different 
countries. Not only are the levels of debt quite 
different, but the other factors affecting 
sustainability are also far from identical. Growth 
rates vary and will continue to vary across 
countries, with some of them being in a better 
position to meet their obligations due to expected 
increases in their productivity. Different ageing 
profiles also mean that some countries are facing 
significant slowdowns in potential growth as their 
economies age, as well as significant increases in 
age-related public spending.  
This focus section will look at why debt has 
increased to the current levels by considering the 
debt dynamics at play. It will then consider what 
this means in terms of the longer-term debt 
sustainability of the euro area countries by 
looking at projections for debt and will discuss 
how these fit into an overall assessment of risk 
facing these countries, before looking at 
alternative measures of risk associated with debt. 
Why debt has increased 
The economic and financial crisis has led to 
increases in debt due to higher deficits and to the 
support measures introduced by many Member 
States in favour of the banking sector. Relative to 
2007, deficits have risen in all euro area countries 
for reasons both within and outside governments’ 
control. (3) The structure of the tax and spending 
                                                        
 
(2) Reinhard and Rogoff (2010) find that debt over 90 % of GDP 
is associated with lower GDP growth, (Reinhard, C.M. and 
K.S. Rogoff (2010), ‘Growth in a time of debt’, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 100, No 2, May). 
Cecchetti et al. (2010) find that high levels of government 
debt negatively affects future growth and that there is a 
threshold effect for debt at a level of 80 %-100 % of GDP, 
over which additional debt has an additional significant 
adverse effect on future growth (Cecchetti S.G, 
M.S. Mohanty and F. Zampolli (2011), ‘The real effects of 
debt’, paper prepared for the ‘Achieving maximum long-run 
growth’ symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 25-27 August).  
For a more in-depth discussion of the effect of debt on 
growth, see Part III of European Commission (2010), ‘Public 
finances in EMU 2010,’ European Economy 4|2010 
(available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_
economy/2010/pdf/ee-2010-4_en.pdf ). 
(3) Over the longer term, many of the aspects of the tax and 
spending system that are outside governments’ control over 
the shorter term can be changed. This statement therefore 
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system means that as economic activity slows, 
lower tax receipts coupled with higher spending 
(primarily due to increased support for the 
unemployed and to the maintenance of spending 
plans set in advance under the expectation of 
stronger growth) cause deficits to grow 
automatically. Typically, a slowdown in economic 
activity will tend to be part of an economic cycle, 
and the upswing part of the cycle will lead to a 
return of revenues and a reduction in deficits, as 
the automatic stabilisers act in the opposite 
direction. However, some of the non-discretionary 
increase in deficits seen in the current crisis is due 
to factors that are not part of the classic economic 
cycle and that are not necessarily expected to have 
a counteracting upswing. Receipts linked to asset 
markets such as the housing and stock markets 
have fallen, following sharp downward 
corrections, leading to increased deficits. (4) 
Insofar as these receipts were previously used to 
fund expenditure programmes which remain in 
place as the revenues disappear, this fall in 
receipts creates a permanent increase in the deficit 
that needs to be addressed through consolidation 
measures. 
Aside from these non-discretionary effects, many 
governments also introduced measures to support 
demand in their economies, which also increased 
deficits. These measures were generally intended 
to be temporary and many have already been 
withdrawn as part of the current consolidation 
process. Nevertheless, even where they have been 
reversed, they still have an effect on the debt. 
Reversing the measures eliminates their direct 
effect on the deficit, but the additional borrowing 
that they generate has been added to the stock of 
debt – which adds to debt interest payments to be 
 
refers to the short term and reflects the fiscal position that 
results from the interaction of the system in place at the time 
of the crisis and the changing macroeconomic situation. 
(4) For a more in-depth discussion see Section IV.2 European 
Commission (2009) ‘Public finances in EMU 2009,’ 
European Economy 5|2009 (available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication
15390_en.pdf  ) and European Commission (2010) op.cit. 
met until the stock is reduced. If the additional 
support they provided is strong enough to have a 
beneficial medium-term effect on economic 
output, the additional growth may eventually 
negate the effect of the higher debt. But if the 
measures were not optimally planned or if there 
are serious concerns about short-term 
sustainability or liquidity, these measures could 
ultimately add to the difficulties of some 
governments.  
Discretionary policy measures were also used to 
support the financial sector. These measures, 
which include bank recapitalisations, are off-
balance-sheet in the sense that they do not form 
part of the deficit although they do add to (gross) 
debt. As such measures often include the transfer 
of assets to the government, the total net increase 
in debt once the immediate years of the crisis are 
over is likely to be lower than the initial increase 
insofar as the government is able to sell its assets 
and recoup some of its investment. 
I.2. Debt developments and sustainability 
Debt dynamics – how debt increases 
The increase in debt depends on the size of the 
primary deficit, the debt level combined with the 
level of interest rates, and economic growth and 
stock-flow adjustment. (5) The following equation 
gives the year-on-year debt dynamics:  
t
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where t is a time subscript; D, PD, Y and SF are 
the stock of government debt, the primary deficit, 
nominal GDP and the stock-flow adjustment 
respectively, and i and y represent the average 
nominal cost of debt and nominal GDP growth.  
                                                        
(5) The stock-flow adjustment consists of government 
transactions that affect the debt level but not the primary 
balances, such as the purchasing of shares in financial 
companies. 
 
Table I.1: Debt dynamics in the euro area since the onset of the crisis (% of GDP) 
           Total Interest rate Growth rate
2008 66.2 69.9 3.6 -1.0 3.2 1.4 3.0 -1.6
2009 69.9 79.3 9.5 3.5 0.9 5.1 2.8 2.3
2010 79.3 85.4 6.0 3.2 2.1 0.8 2.8 -2.0
2011 85.4 87.7 2.4 1.3 0.6 0.4 3.0 -2.5
2012 87.7 88.5 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.2 3.2 -2.9
Total increase 2007-11 21.5 7.0 6.8 7.7 11.6 -3.9
Interest-growth rate differential 
Increase in debt due to
Previous 
year's 
outturn Current year Increase
Debt 
Primary 
deficit
Stock flow 
adjusment
Source: Commission spring 2011 forecasts.  
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The primary deficit equals the deficit net of 
interest costs. Rises in the overall deficit due to 
automatic stabilisers, non-cyclical non-
discretionary changes such as the effect on 
revenues of asset markets or structural changes to 
the economy, or discretionary changes to tax and 
spending will have a one to one equivalent effect 
on the primary deficit. The term in parentheses 
represents the ‘snowball’ effect of public debt. It 
measures the combined effect of interest 
expenditure and economic growth on the debt 
ratio. A higher starting level of debt increases the 
value of this term directly through the value of the 
first component, and possibly indirectly through a 
reduced level of economic growth and a higher 
interest rate. Whether the snowball effect is 
positive or negative depends on the interest-
growth-rate differential ( ). When the 
differential is positive (i.e. the interest rate is 
higher than the rate of economic growth), the 
snowball effect is positive leading to an increase 
in debt. If it is negative – usually in countries that 
have exceptionally high growth rates – economic 
growth is high enough to make up for the interest 
payments, pushing the ratio of debt to GDP down.  
tt yi −
The final term in the equation is the stock-flow 
adjustment. Usually, it is assumed that this will 
average zero over a long enough time period, 
although the experience of the first decade or so 
of EMU has shown that it has tended to be 
positive, adding to the upward dynamics of debt.  
Table I.1 shows the increases in debt over the 
crisis years, and their components, for the euro 
area. Using 2007 as the base year (the first line 
shows the increase from 2007 to 2008), the table 
provides the outcomes until 2010 and the 
Commission’s spring 2011 forecasts for 2011 and 
2012. Overall, by the end of 2011, debt is 
expected to rise by 21.5 pp of GDP, with around a 
third of the increase due to the primary deficits, 
another third due to stock-flow adjustments and a 
final third due to the snowball effect. In the later 
years, the consolidation efforts and return of 
growth are such as to leave interest payments as 
the primary upward driver of debt.  
Until the actual debt level falls, there is little 
reason to suppose that interest payments will fall. 
In practice, however, the relationship between 
interest payments and the debt level is not simple. 
Interest payments are a function of existing 
obligations by governments and of the new 
borrowing that they undertake. This new 
borrowing is composed of both the new additions 
to the stock of debt and the rolling over of 
existing debt reaching maturity. The amount of 
new borrowing and the relative terms of the rolled 
over debt compared with the terms at which it was 
being financed make the year-on-year difference 
in the interest rate effect shown in Table I.1. 
The level at which governments are able to 
undertake new borrowing and roll over debt 
which has reached maturity will depend on the 
market’s demand for this debt and the price it is 
prepared to pay for it. Countries where a large 
pool of saving exists and the population has 
typically used government bonds as a preferred 
form of saving (maybe as hedge against future tax 
increases) should be able to borrow at lower rates 
than countries with no such tradition, other things 
being equal. But a key feature of the price and 
therefore the interest rate will depend on the 
perceived riskiness of the debt in terms of the risk 
of default and this in turn will be linked to the 
sustainability of the debt level. 
The sustainability of debt 
The sustainability of public finances relates to 
continued ability of a government to finance its 
debt. Although there are a number of definitions 
of sustainability that could be given, the 
intertemporal budget constraint can serve as a 
starting point for defining what a sustainable debt 
level entails. The intertemporal budget constraint 
(IBC) is given by: 
tT
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A derivation of this equation is given in Box II.1. 
Intuitively, the IBC is met if the stream of future 
primary surpluses is large enough to enable a 
government to meet its financing obligations. 
Doing so is dependent on the starting level of 
debt, the primary balances that are possible and 
any future differential between interest rates and 
growth rates. Where debt levels are high, not only 
is the stream of future surpluses that are needed 
high, but the impact of high debt on the 
differential between interest rate and growth rate 
is likely to require even higher primary balances 
to make up for the lower growth and/or higher 
interest. The feasibility of running high enough 
primary balances is essentially political. While 
there is necessarily a point at which the required 
primary balances are so high as to either take up 
all of GDP or require tax to be so high that growth 
grinds to a halt, political constraints will apply  
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well before this situation is reached. (6) High 
primary balances require resources to be diverted 
away from the economy to debt financing, 
entailing high levels of taxation and low 
expenditure on government transfers and services. 
The prospect of default is likely to become more 
and more attractive as taxpayers feel the pressure 
of the situation, so that political sustainability 
ends up being a significantly tighter constraint 
than purely economic calculations. 
Debt dynamics scenarios for the euro area 
In order to gain insights into the future challenges 
for fiscal policies in the euro area coming out of 
the crisis, it is informative to look at the projected 
evolution of the debt ratio in a constant policy 
setting and also under different assumptions on 
key variables affecting the debt dynamics. When 
making such projections, key assumptions need to 
be made for fiscal consolidation efforts and 
 
                                                       
(6) These political constraints apply when Blanchard’s 
‘maximum politically feasible primary surplus’, as defined in 
O. Blanchard (1984) ‘Current and anticipated deficits, 
interest rates and economic activity’, European Economic 
Review, Vol. 25(1), pp 7–28, is reached. 
underlying interest and growth rates as well as for 
future costs related to population ageing.(7)  
 
 
(7) The projections are based on the Commission’s spring 2011 
forecasts (up to 2012), and the Europe 2020 macroeconomic 
scenarios up to 2020. Beyond 2020, the scenarios assume a 
return of growth to the long-term trend as agreed by the 
Commission and Ageing Working Group of the Economic 
Policy Committee and published in the 2009 Ageing Report 
(AR). The specific assumptions made are: (i) the increase in 
age-related expenditure was made consistent with the new 
macroeconomic scenario, by using implicit elasticities 
derived from the 2009 AR sensitivity tests. Age-related 
expenditure in the EU increases, on average, by 0.4 pp of 
GDP in the EU as a whole up to 2020 (0.6 pp in the euro 
area) and by 1.9 pp (2.2 pp in the euro area) up to 2030; (ii) 
the tax-to-GDP ratios are projected to converge linearly, by 
2018, to their pre-2007 level for countries with 2012 tax 
burdens below their 2007 level. For countries with 2012 tax-
to-GDP ratios above the pre-crisis level, it is assumed that the 
tax ratio remains constant. The cyclical component of tax 
revenues is added to the projected values on the basis of 
OECD elasticities; (iii) the implicit interest rate on 
government debt converges linearly to 3 % in real terms (the 
value assumed for the purposes of the long-term 
sustainability of public finance assessment) in 2015 (or 
2017), when the output gap is closed and remains constant 
thereafter, for all countries; (iv) the inflation rate (GDP 
deflator) converges linearly to 2 % in 2015 (or 2017), when 
the output gap is closed and remains constant thereafter, for 
all countries; (v) zero stock-flow adjustment after 2012, i.e. 
 
 
Box I.1: The intertemporal budget constraint
The equation describing debt dynamics is given as: 
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Under the assumption that iit =  and yyt = for all t, and setting t=0 as the starting period for assessing 
sustainability, solving the equation forward until a time period t=T, gives: 
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Sustainability can be defined in a number of ways, yielding different definitions of the intertemporal budget 
constraint. One such definition is that the discounted value of future debt over an infinite horizon equals zero, which 
is equivalent to saying that the total sum of future primary deficits more than covers the value of the starting 
(today's) level of debt. This gives the following condition: 
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Graph I.4 depicts the projected evolution for the 
government gross debt ratio, for the euro area. 
The solid thick line shows the outcome for a 
baseline scenario under the assumption of no 
fiscal consolidation measures beyond those 
contained in the Commission’s spring 2011 
forecasts (i.e. structural primary balance/GDP 
ratio kept constant at the 2012 estimated level(8)) 
and incorporating the expected future age-related 
spending. (9) Primary balances fall short of what 
is needed to stabilise the ratio of public debt to 
GDP, which rises steadily over the projection 
period. By 2015, the debt is projected to be at 
around 90 % of GDP in the euro area (more than 
20 pp of GDP higher than before the crisis). It 
would continue increasing to about 93 % of GDP 
by 2020 and further to 113 % of GDP by 2030, 
albeit with large differences across countries.  
Graph I.4: Medium-term debt projections 
under alternative assumptions – euro area  
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Table I.2 presents a breakdown of the medium-
term debt-to-GDP projections for the euro area 
that allows the contributions of the main drivers in 
the baseline scenario to be considered: 1) the 
primary balance; 2) age-related expenditure; 
3) the snowball effect. The fiscal consolidation 
over the years to 2012 results in a reduction in the 
structural primary balance, which helps to limit 
the increase in the debt ratio in the period to 2020. 
However, ageing costs weigh on the primary 
balance over time and, on current policies, would 
                                                                                  
                                                       no further purchases of financial assets or recapitalisations of 
financial institutions, nor disposal of such assets.  
(8) For Greece, Ireland and Portugal, the structural primary 
balances in their economic adjustment programmes (2014 for 
Greece and 2015 for Ireland and Portugal) are kept constant 
in the baseline scenario.  
(9) For details on future age-related spending, see European 
Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009), ‘2009 
Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the 
EU-27 Member States (2008-2060)’, European Economy, 
No 2. 
send the primary balance into the red again in the 
mid 2020s. Moreover, with rising debt, the 
snowball effect would prove significant over time; 
interest expenditure would rise continuously and 
increasingly outweigh the growth effect. 
Sustained fiscal consolidation would curb the 
euro area’s debt dynamics 
Graph I.4 also shows the results of additional 
scenarios built up to examine the long-run 
implications of a gradual fiscal adjustment and 
also of alternative assumptions on the differential 
between interest rate and growth rate. A first 
fiscal consolidation scenario is based on the 
assumption of all euro-area countries 
implementing fiscal consolidation efforts from 
2012, measured in terms of an improvement of the 
structural balance by 0.5 % of GDP per year until 
the medium-term objective (MTO) reported by 
the country is reached. (10) (11) The graph 
illustrates that, for the euro area, this 
consolidation pace – the benchmark consolidation 
effort in the Stability and Growth Pact – would be 
enough to halt the growth in debt by 2013, after 
which the ratio of debt to GDP would decrease, 
but only slowly, from 89 % in 2013 to 78 % in 
2020. It would fall below 60 % only in 2029. 
A stronger consolidation effort of 1 % of GDP per 
year until the MTO of each euro area Member 
State is reached would also halt the increase in the 
government debt ratio from 2013. Nevertheless, in 
2020, the debt ratio would still be larger than 
before the crisis (by about 6 pp of GDP), and it 
would fall below the 60 % threshold only in 2026.  
Stress tests based on different assumptions on 
the interest/growth rate differential 
In addition to the aforementioned scenarios, stress 
tests reveal the sensitivity of debt developments to 
different assumptions on the interest rate and 
economic growth by modelling an increase and 
decrease of 1 pp in the differential between these 
two variables. The interest/growth rate differential 
is a critical input parameter in determining the 
future evolution of public debt. Countries with 
high levels of debt face the possibility of an ever 
 
(10) For Greece, Ireland and Portugal all extrapolations are done 
taking into account their economic adjustment programmes 
(till 2014 and 2015 respectively) i.e. using the debt levels and 
primary balances at the end of the programmes.   
(11) The MTO effectively corresponds to a close to balance or 
surplus budgetary position. See section I.3 of European 
Commission (2011) ‘Public finances in EMU 2011,’ 
European Economy, No. 3|2011 available online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_
economy/2011/pdf/ee-2011-3_en.pdf. 
- 12 -
I. Debt dynamics and sustainability in the euro area 
 
                                                       
increasing debt burden in the event of either 
higher interest rates or lower GDP growth rates or 
both. Empirical evidence also confirms that when 
debt becomes very large, it may be difficult to 
generate the primary balance that is necessary to 
ensure sustainability. (12) In turn, a deteriorating 
domestic outlook for fiscal deficits and debt is 
likely to be associated with higher interest rates. 
As the increase in interest rates only affects new 
debt issuance and refinancing needs, countries 
with short average debt maturity rates are more 
exposed to interest rate shocks than those that 
have longer debt maturity rates.  
The stress tests on the interest/growth rate 
differential clearly show that a higher interest rate 
and/or a lower GDP growth rate will have a strong 
adverse impact on debt going forward (see 
Graph I.4), pointing to a markedly more 
demanding consolidation effort than under a 
baseline scenario if markets impose on them a risk 
premium that translates into a lasting increase in 
the average cost of debt. By contrast, a lower 
differential would broadly lead to stabilisation of 
the debt ratio at the current elevated level until the 
early 2020s, which would however start 
increasing thereafter due to the effect of ageing on 
public finances and on growth.  
Though these scenarios are based on a number of 
simplifying assumptions, they suggest that fast 
debt reduction requires determined and sustained 
consolidation efforts. Nonetheless, even in the 
scenario in which a structural fiscal adjustment of 
1 pp per year is assumed until the MTOs are 
reached, it would take 15 years for the debt ratio 
in the euro area to fall below the 60 % of GDP 
threshold. The simulations also reveal that if 
 
(12) See IMF (2010), ‘Fiscal Space’, IMF Staff Position Note, 
September 1.  
measures are put in place to reduce the interest 
rate and/or increase the GDP growth rate, the 
effect on the debt ratio could be significant. Still, 
this would only stabilise the debt ratio over the 
coming decade, and from the 2020s onwards it 
would start to rise again. If, by contrast, growth 
prospects and/or financing conditions were worse 
than in the baseline scenario, curbing the debt 
dynamics would be even more challenging.  
It is clear that reversing the effect of the crisis and 
dealing with the effects of an ageing population 
will require a strong and sustained policy 
response. Nevertheless, the benefits of rising to 
the challenge in timely manner are clear. Not only 
do strong policy measures change the perception 
of the sustainability risk faced by Member States, 
but the sooner that countries can benefit from the 
reduced interest payments and higher growth that 
lower debt entails, the better the outlook. 
While this analysis highlights the magnitude of 
the challenge ahead, expanding it to take other 
factors into account can help better understand the 
related policy implications. The remainder of this 
text presents additional methodologies that 
complement the assessment presented so far and 
provide a broader picture of the current debt 
situation. These include the analysis of fiscal 
reaction functions (in the remainder of this 
section) and of the risk of fiscal crises (next 
section). 
Using fiscal reaction functions as part of 
sustainability analysis 
In order to assess whether it is feasible to put in 
place the policy responses required to address the 
sustainability challenge facing the euro area 
economies, fiscal reaction functions (FRF) can be 
 
Table I.2: General government gross debt for the euro area – baseline projections (in %) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2025 2030
Gross debt ratio 79.3 85.4 87.9 88.7 89.1 89.4 89.7 90.5 91.2 91.8 92.5 93.2 100.2 113.2
changes in the debt ratio (1+2+3) 9.4 6.1 2.4 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.9 3.0
of which (1) Overall primary balance (+ = deficit) 3.5 3.2 1.3 0.4 -0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0.7 1.7
Structural primary balance (kept constant at 2012 lvl) 1.4 1.2 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8
Cyclical component 2.1 2.0 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ageing cost (incl. revenues pensions tax) 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 2.0 3.0
Property incomes -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Revenues -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5
(2) Snowball effect (interest rate/growth differential) 5.2 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.3 1.6
Interest expenditure 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.8 5.4
Growth effect (real) 3.0 -1.4 -1.4 -1.5 -1.6 -1.7 -1.7 -1.3 -1.4 -1.5 -1.7 -1.8 -1.6 -1.7
Inflation effect -0.7 -0.6 -1.2 -1.4 -1.5 -1.6 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -1.9 -2.2
(3) Stock flow adjustment 0.7 2.1 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PM : Structural balance (+ = deficit) 2.7 2.9 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.7 5.4 7.0
Key macroeconomic assumptions
GDP growth (real) -4.1 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.6 1.6
Interest rate (real) 2.9 2.7 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Inflation (GDP deflator) 1.0 0.8 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Source: Commission services. 
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estimated and their results interpreted within the 
context of current debt ratios. These consider how 
governments have tended to adjust their primary 
balances in response to debt increases, and 
interpret this past behaviour as a realistic guide to 
fiscal behaviour in the future. (13) Econometric 
techniques are used to evaluate the empirical 
response of the primary balance to the outstanding 
level of public debt, after controlling for a number 
of economic and institutional determinants. The 
resulting estimates of the primary balance drawn 
from the FRF model capture the structural 
surplus-generating capacity of countries and are 
then combined with the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) to calculate 
sustainable debt thresholds for euro area Member 
States. The sustainable debt threshold is a 
measure of the steady state differential between 
the interest rate and the rate of growth of GDP. A 
country is then defined as being fiscally 
sustainable as long as its actual debt does not 
exceed the sustainable debt threshold.  
Graph I.5: Debt sustainability thresholds vs 
current debt (% of GDP) (1) 
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(1) The debt sustainability thresholds are derived from primary 
balance estimates from a Fiscal Reaction Function estimated over 
the 1975–2010 period and from the average interest-growth rate 
differentials over the 1990–2010 (DT1), 1975–2010 (DT1bis) 
and 2008–2014 (DT1ter) periods, respectively.  
Source: Commission services based on AMECO and 
World Bank Database of Political Institutions. 
Part IV of European Commission (2011) presents 
the results of the econometric analysis in more 
detail. (14) The resulting debt thresholds for euro 
area Member States derived from the analysis 
covering the 1975–2010 and 1990–2009 periods 
are shown in Graphs I.5 and I.6, respectively, 
against actual debt ratios in 2010. In each chart 
three thresholds are displayed, corresponding to 
                                                        
(13) A model-based estimate of primary balance, where the model 
is the FRF, is preferable to the simple average of past primary 
balances as it captures structural determinants of the latter.   
(14) See European Commission (2011) Part IV.4, op cit  for more 
details. 
the average interest rate-growth rate differentials 
over three different periods, i.e. 1990–2010, 
1975–2010 and 2008–2014, in order to assess the 
robustness of the sustainability ranking to the 
historical vs. forecast growth-adjusted interest 
rate. The interpretation is straightforward: a 
country’s fiscal position is not sustainable if the 
actual debt ratio exceeds the threshold. Countries 
are ranked in decreasing order of sustainability 
(i.e. from left to right: sustainable in all scenarios, 
only in some, never). 
Graph I.6: Debt sustainability thresholds vs 
current debt, alternative estimates  
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(1) The thresholds are calculated as in the previous graph except 
for the primary balance estimates that come from a Fiscal 
Reaction Function estimated over the 1990–2009 period. As in 
the previous graph, average interest-growth rate differentials are 
calculated over the 1990–2010 (DT2), 1975–2010 (DT2bis) and 
2008–2014 (DT2ter) periods, respectively. 
Source: Commission services based on AMECO and 
World Bank Database of Political Institutions 
To a large extent, the two different models 
presented in the graphs give (reassuringly) similar 
results. Countries where the current debt ratio 
exceeds debt thresholds based on both FRF 
models, regardless of the reference period for 
interest growth differentials, are AT, DE, ES, FR, 
EL, IE, IT, PT and SI, albeit with a varying 
magnitude of the sustainability gap by country. At 
the opposite end of the ranking are FI, LU, MT 
and NL, which never exceed the threshold, and 
BE which exceeds it only in one out of six cases.  
In order to provide a simple test of the extent to 
which surplus-generating capacity needs to be 
improved in order to turn a fiscally unsustainable 
country into a sustainable one, debt thresholds 
have been recalculated based on the average of 
the three largest estimated primary balances from 
the FRF. This tests whether the current debt ratio 
would become sustainable if the future surplus-
generating capacity of the country were to equal 
the best primary balance performance achieved in 
- 14 -
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the past according to the FRF model. (15) 
Graphs I.7 and I.8 show the debt thresholds based 
on the best estimated primary balance (‘DT1best’ 
and ‘DT2best’) together with the general 
thresholds (‘DT1’ and ‘DT2’), both derived from 
the first and second FRF model, respectively, 
against the actual debt ratio. (16) 
Graph I.7: Debt sustainability thresholds for 
the best 3 years of estimated primary balance 
(1975–2010) vs. current debt (% of GDP) (1) 
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(1) DT1 = Debt Threshold 1 as in Graph II.5; DT1best = Debt 
Threshold derived from the (average of the) three largest 
estimated primary balances from the FRF estimated over the 
1975-2010 period and from the average interest rate-GDP growth 
rate differential over the 1990-2010 period. Figures for thresholds 
in a few countries exceed the maximum value of the axis 
(200 %). 
Source: Commission services, AMECO and World Bank 
Database of Political Institutions 
 
This approach obviously increases the estimated 
level of sustainable debt. According to ‘DTbest’, 
the sustainability assessment moves from negative 
to positive for AT, DE, ES, IT, PT and SI 
according to the first FRF model, and for AT, CY, 
DE, ES and IT according to the second FRF 
model. For most countries, the response required 
by the sustainability challenge is therefore 
challenging, but not unprecedented. However, a 
few Member States remain fiscally unsustainable 
even under this more ‘optimistic’ scenario, i.e. 
FR, EL and IE according to both models, and PT 
and SI according to the second FRF model.  
                                                        
(15) A current debt ratio becomes sustainable if it is lower than 
the recalculated debt threshold. 
(16) As explained in section IV.4 of European Commission 
(2011), whenever the overall average of estimated primary 
balances was negative, it has been restricted to positive 
primary balance values in order to increase the number of 
countries included in threshold calculation. This implies that 
for those countries with only one or two positive values for 
the estimated primary balance, the main debt threshold 
already implies a significant over-estimation of surplus-
generating capacity and would decrease if based on the best 
three-year primary balance values. These countries were then 
excluded from calculation of DTbest, i.e. SK in Graph II.7 
and MT and SK in Graph II.8.  
Of course, achieving in the future the best 
outcomes seen so far for several years may raise 
serious political difficulties, as the primary 
balances on which this exercise was based are 
unlikely to be maintained indefinitely. Moreover, 
although past fiscal behaviour can serve as a 
guide to the future, providing information about 
the feasible magnitude of future primary balance, 
it can only serve as an imperfect guide, 
particularly given the unique circumstances in 
which the European economies find themselves. 
Nevertheless, there are countries, such as 
Belgium, that have maintained sizeable primary 
surpluses for long periods of time, indicating that 
it is possible if the political willingness is there. 
Graph I.8: Debt sustainability thresholds for 
the best three years of estimated primary balance 
(1990–2009) vs current debt (% of GDP) (1) 
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(1) DT2 = Debt Threshold 2 as in Graph II.6; DT2best = Debt 
Threshold derived from the (average of the) three largest 
estimated primary balances from the FRF estimated over the  
1990-2009 period and from the average interest rate-GDP growth 
rate differential over the 1990-2010 period. Figures for thresholds 
in a few countries exceed the maximum value of the axis 
(200 %).. 
Source: Commission services, AMECO and World Bank 
Database of Political Institutions 
I.3. Assessing the risk of fiscal crises 
Expanding on the existing methodologies to 
gauge fiscal risks 
The analysis and discussion so far has focused on 
looking at debt projections and gaining an idea of 
future sustainability based on debt dynamics and 
the intertemporal budget constraint set out in the 
first part of this section. But aside from 
assumptions and projections about the primary 
balances and their components, interest and 
growth rates, it is evident that levels of debt and 
concepts of sustainability depend on a broad range 
of other factors. The Great Recession has 
illustrated how problems emanating from the 
financial sector can have devastating effects on 
public finances and on governments’ perceived 
- 15 -
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ability to control them. In turn, the growth rate of 
the economy is related to a host of other variables, 
with competitiveness problems often being 
symptoms of deep-seated productivity challenges.  
The framework for assessing fiscal sustainability 
can be usefully complemented by fiscal crisis risk 
models that aim at timely detection of risks of 
debt distress. These models help to gauge fiscal 
crisis risks by allowing for the determination of 
critical thresholds for a set of variables and for 
composite indicators combining them. By 
identifying increased risk of debt distress, 
policymakers can respond in a timely manner. 
Models of this kind are taken into consideration 
by the IMF to supplement the framework used for 
assessing external and fiscal sustainability in the 
context of Fund-supported programmes and 
Article IV surveillance. Recently, fiscal crisis risk 
models have also become a building block of the 
joint IMF-FSB Early Warning Exercise ,(17) 
created in 2008 at the request of the G20, in 
response to the need to improve policymakers’ 
ability to spot risks and vulnerabilities quickly in 
order to be able to coordinate early policy 
responses.  
Results from a fiscal crisis risk model based on 
the ‘signals approach’(18) are presented here. The 
model provides thresholds based on past 
behaviour, beyond which fiscal crisis signals are 
detected for: 1) each individual variable included 
in the analysis, 2) a composite indicator 
incorporating all variables, 3) thematic composite 
indicators referring to different subsets of 
variables (e.g. fiscal, financial, competitiveness). 
The signals approach allows consideration (and 
aggregation into an overall index) of a large set of 
variables, thus permitting quite a comprehensive 
analysis of underlying vulnerabilities. For the 
analysis presented here, both fiscal and macro-
financial variables are selected and their 
correlation with past fiscal crises is first analysed. 
An optimal threshold (for each variable included 
in the analysis) is found, which maximises the 
ability of the variable to predict a fiscal crisis 
 
                                                        
(17) See IMF (2011), ‘The IMF-FSB early warning exercise. 
Design and methodological toolkit’, September 2010, 
(available online at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/090110.pdf). 
(18) Seminal papers on this approach are: Kaminsky, G., S. 
Lizondo, and C.M. Reinhart (1998), ‘Leading indicators of 
currency crises’, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 45, No. 1. 
and Kaminsky, G.L. and C.M. Reinhart (1999), ‘The twin 
crises: the Causes of banking and balance-of-payments 
problems’, American Economic Review, Vol. 89(3), pp. 473-
500.  
based on the value taken by the variable one year 
ahead of the crisis. A variable will be sending a 
‘crisis signal’ when it takes a value above or 
below such optimal threshold, depending on the 
variable in question. (19) (20) Once these 
triggering thresholds are calculated, the variables 
can be aggregated into composite indicators of 
fiscal crisis vulnerability. 
Giving concrete guidance in a sustainability 
assessment framework based on the overall fiscal 
crisis vulnerability index requires careful 
consideration of which variables drive the 
outcome of the exercise on a country by country 
basis. This makes the signals approach an 
instrument that is best used at the beginning of the 
assessment procedure.  
In the context of a regular fiscal crisis early 
warning exercise, the overall indicator of fiscal 
crisis vulnerability can be computed for a selected 
sample of countries in each year and compared 
against the critical threshold identified. Indicator 
values beyond the threshold for a country in a 
given year provide warnings of fiscal crisis risks 
for the following year. The values of thematic 
indicators (grouping different subsets of variables 
– fiscal, financial and competitiveness variables) 
and of the individual variables themselves relative 
to their respective thresholds can also be used to 
complete the picture of the sources of 
vulnerabilities and to highlight areas where early 
policy intervention might be required. Finally, 
alongside the analysis of values taken against 
critical thresholds at a certain point in time, the 
monitoring at country level should also pay 
attention to the evolution of the fiscal crisis 
vulnerability indicator over time, with increases in 
the value of the indicator highlighting increased 
vulnerability. This is of course also relevant in 
cases where countries remain below the critical 
threshold of fiscal crisis risk. 
                                                        
(19) For the change in public debt over GDP, for instance, a value 
above the optimal threshold would signal a fiscal crisis, while 
for the general government balance over GDP a value below 
the optimal threshold is taken as a crisis signal. 
(20) In brief, the methodology for determining the optimal 
thresholds works as follows. Using historical data, signals 
sent by the variable for the different countries and years are 
compared to the crisis definition. A signal is correct when for 
the country in question the variable indicates a crisis (non-
crisis) year and indeed the year following that in which the 
signal is recorded turns out to be a crisis (non-crisis) year. On 
the contrary, a signal is wrong when the variable has 
signalled no crisis ahead of a crisis year (type II error) and 
when it has signalled a crisis ahead of a non-crisis year (type 
I error). The optimal threshold is chosen in such a way as to 
minimise the share of not signalled crises plus the share of 
non-crises signalled as crises (see Part IV, Chapter 3 in 
European Commission (2011) for more details). 
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Preliminary results 
The calculation of the optimal thresholds is based 
on a panel of 33 countries (all EU countries 
except CY, LU and MT, and nine other advanced 
economies).(21) Data come from AMECO, the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) and the 
Bank for International Settlements. Time series 
covering the period 1970-2010 are used whenever 
possible but for a number of variables data are 
only available starting from 1995. The 
identification of fiscal crisis events over the time 
interval 1970–2010 is borrowed from Baldacci et 
al. (22) A fiscal crisis episode is identified if any 
of four different criteria is satisfied: high inflation 
rates, large sovereign bond yield spreads, public 
debt default or restructuring/rescheduling based 
on Standard & Poor’s definition, large-scale IMF-
supported programme in place. 
The fiscal variables entering the calculations 
include the general government’s gross debt (and 
its first difference), the short-term debt, the total, 
primary and cyclically-adjusted balances, the 
change in government expenditure and in 
government final consumption expenditure, and 
the change in projected age-related public 
expenditure. Among the macro-financial 
variables, the following are considered: net 
financial assets of the total economy, net savings 
of households and non-financial corporations, 
private sector debt, net acquisition of financial 
assets for the private sector, leverage of financial 
corporations, short-term debt of non-financial 
corporations, and competitiveness variables like 
the change in the real effective exchange rate, the 
change in nominal unit labour costs and the 
current account. 
 
                                                       
European Commission (2011) Part IV presents the 
results of the analysis and the derived thresholds 
for both the individual variables and the 
composite indicators. It shows that the overall 
composite indicator derived would have correctly 
identified 73 % of past crisis events and 83 % of 
past non-crisis events (i.e. correctly signalled that 
no crisis was imminent), highlighting quite a good 
overall performance for this type of 
 
(21) CY, LU and MT are excluded from the sample as the 
necessary information on recorded fiscal crisis events over 
the past four decades is currently missing. The other nine 
advanced economies included in the analysis are: Australia, 
Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, 
Switzerland, US. 
(22) Baldacci, E., Petrova, I., Belhocine, N., Dobrescu, G., and S. 
Mazraani, (2011) ‘Assessing Fiscal Stress’, IMF Working 
Paper 11/100. 
methodology. (23) The fact that the indicator 
displays a relatively good performance at not 
missing crises is a particularly encouraging 
feature. 
In general, joint consideration of all the variables 
combined into a composite indicator tends to 
provide better results in terms of early warnings 
of fiscal crises than separate observation of the 
individual variables, although individual variables 
are necessary to understand the specific sources of 
vulnerability. The overall index of fiscal crisis 
vulnerability could therefore be a very useful 
building block of an early warning system. 
Regular monitoring of the index should consider 
both its level (above or below the critical 
threshold of 0.45) and changes in the index over 
time reflecting improvement/deterioration in 
terms of fiscal crisis vulnerability for the country 
concerned. 
Graph I.9: The fiscal crisis vulnerability index, 
selected euro area countries (2006-10) 
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The evolution of the index is presented jointly for 
a number of euro area countries in Graphs I.9 
to I.11. In Graph I.9, values taken by the overall 
index from 2006 to 2010 are considered relative 
to the estimated 0.45 threshold. Over this time 
interval the index would have consistently 
signalled six euro area countries (NL, BE, DE, 
AT, FI and FR) as remaining broadly on the safe 
side for the following year. On the contrary, ES, 
PT and EL exceeded the threshold for fiscal crisis 
vulnerability over all five years, and more 
strongly so in 2009 with a peak value of 0.86 for 
EL. Other euro area countries that have exceeded 
the threshold for fiscal crisis vulnerability over the 
                                                        
(23) The empirical literature shows that early warning system 
methodologies are typically subject to non-negligible 
predictive errors. See Baldacci et al. (2011) op. cit. and 
Hemming et al. (2003), ‘Fiscal vulnerability and financial 
crises in emerging market economies,’ IMF Occasional 
Paper, No. 218. 
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last three years are EE, IE, SI and SK in 2008 and 
EE, IT, SI and SK in 2009.(24) Graph I.9, also 
shows that the crisis vulnerability index is lower 
in 2010 than in 2009 for all countries, signalling a 
reduced risk. As economic and fiscal fundamental 
continue to strengthen, it is expected that the 
index will continue to fall in 2011.  
Graph I.10: Evolution of the fiscal crisis 
vulnerability index for DE, FR, IT 1999-2010 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Graphs I.10 and I.11 provide information on the 
evolution of the fiscal crisis vulnerability index 
between 1999 and 2010 for selected countries. 
Spikes in the index are particularly evident for IE, 
ES, EL and PT in 2008 and 2009. 
Graph I.11: Evolution of the fiscal crisis 
vulnerability index for ES, EL, PT, IE 1999-2010 
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The analysis of the overall index should be 
complemented by analysis of the thematic 
composite indicators. These two indicators 
provide information on the respective 
contributions of different groups of variables to 
                                                        
                                                       
(24) The low values for IE are explained by the fact that IE does 
not provide series for the financial variables which are 
consolidated by national account subsector (non-consolidated 
data could be used in a regular assessment). 
fiscal crisis vulnerability. The analysis should 
then be further deepened at individual variable 
level to have the full picture of where 
vulnerabilities stem from. 
By looking retrospectively at the results obtained 
for countries that were particularly strongly hit by 
the crisis, it is possible to gauge the usefulness of 
the more detailed indicators. As an example, on 
an ex post basis, it is now clear that Greece was 
building up imbalances in the run-up to the crisis 
that have since proved very costly. (25) Our results 
for Greece show that many fiscal variables were 
consistently signalling crisis risks from 2002 
onwards. For the years since 2006 almost all fiscal 
variables with relatively high signalling power 
(the primary balance, cyclically adjusted balance, 
gross and net debt, and change in projected age-
related public expenditure) identified a risk of 
crisis, while the change in gross debt over GDP 
started flashing red in 2009. Fiscal crisis signals 
have also been sent by macro-financial variables 
with some of the highest signalling powers, 
including net financial assets of the total 
economy, net savings of households and private 
sector debt since 2007, and the leverage of 
financial corporations since 2008. (26) On the 
competitiveness side, the current account over 
GDP and the growth rate of nominal unit labour 
costs have been flashing red since 2006. Thus, not 
only did the overall indicator correctly point to 
weaknesses in Greece, but also the analysis of the 
sub-indices and of the single variables showed 
that both the government (the fiscal side) and the 
private sector (the macro-financial side) had put in 
place a dangerous excess of consumption 
accompanied by a process of debt accumulation. 
I.4. Conclusions 
The deterioration in the public finances of the 
euro area since the onset of the economic and 
financial crisis comes on top of already high 
starting levels of debt and at a time when the 
European economies are facing the prospect of the 
sustainability challenge of an ageing population. 
In the absence of additional consolidation 
measures, taking the Commission’s spring 2011 
forecasts and projecting the debt ratio forward 
while incorporating additional age-related 
 
(25) It should be noted that any such a conclusion is based on an 
ex-post analysis relying on currently available data and not 
on data that were available in real time. Furthermore, the risk 
assessment instruments presented here have been developed 
in response to the crisis and were not available before the 
crisis.  
(26) Some of these variables are also part of the Scoreboard on 
which the recently adopted Excessive Imbalance Procedure 
will be based.  
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spending shows debt passing the 100 % of GDP 
mark over the next 15 years and continuing to 
increase thereafter.  
It is clear that in order to reverse the increases in 
growth and ensure the sustainability of public 
finances, significant permanent consolidation 
measures – over and above those already 
introduced – will be necessary in a number of 
euro area countries. The analysis based on the 
fiscal reaction functions shows that in some cases 
the required primary balance to bring debt back to 
a sustainable level is particularly high, albeit not 
unprecendented, by historical standards.  
Moreover, although the aftermath of the current 
crisis is central to budgetary policy, it is important 
not just to focus on the present, but to put into 
place measures to reduce the likelihood and/or 
severity of future crises. The ability to predict the 
risk of future crises is a valuable one, to allow 
policy measures to be taken in due time, where a 
risk of a crisis is identified. In this context, the 
indicators of fiscal crisis risk presented in this 
section are an important part of the toolbox 
required to analyse debt sustainability.  
 

II. Special topics on the euro-area economy 
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While fiscal imbalances are at the forefront of the current policy debate, they are by no means the only area 
where policy action is needed. The contributions in this chapter take a closer look at external imbalances, 
housing imbalances and industries' resilience to shocks in the euro area. The analyses show that while 
macroeconomic adjustment in these areas is essentially market based, structural policies can play an important 
role in either facilitating market-based adjustment or reducing the risk of emergence of imbalances. 
Internal devaluation and external imbalances: a model-based analysis 
While nominal exchange rate devaluations are not an available policy tool for the correction of external 
imbalances in EMU, various ‘internal devaluation’ measures can mimic the effects of nominal devaluations by 
reducing domestic prices and encouraging similar expenditure-switching effects. This section looks at two 
potential internal devaluation measures: (i) a tax shift from employers’ social security contributions towards 
consumption taxes; (ii)  public-sector wage moderation. The effectiveness of these measures is assessed using 
QUEST, the Commission’s structural macro-economic model. The simulations show that the tax reform can 
raise employment, boost GDP and improve the net foreign asset position. Public-sector wage moderation is 
also shown to spill over to private-sector wages, thereby reducing production costs and improving 
competitiveness. However, like ‘external’ exchange rate adjustments, internal devaluations are unlikely to have 
permanent trade balance effects. Over time, their positive effect on GDP translates into higher domestic and 
import demand and this income effect largely offsets the original improvement in the trade balance. 
Sectoral implications of external rebalancing 
External imbalances have accumulated in several euro-area Member States over the pre-crisis period. Though 
the largest current account deficits have been receding since 2008, the external rebalancing process still has 
some way to go. Successful external adjustment relies on changes in both the demand side and – an often-
neglected point – the supply side. Evidence shows that large and persistent current account imbalances in the 
euro area are associated with supply distortions in the form of skews in the industrial composition of the 
economy. Successful rebalancing requires a reversal of the excessive pre-crisis growth in non-tradable output 
and a reallocation of capital and labour to the tradable sector. The reallocation process may be hampered by 
sectoral mismatches between supply and demand for labour, in which case, external rebalancing could come at 
the cost of persistently higher unemployment. To counter these risks policies should aim at facilitating labour 
mobility across sectors and at supporting investment in the tradable sector.  
Sectoral resilience to shocks 
This section analyses business cycles at the level of disaggregated industrial sectors in euro-area Member 
States and looks at differences in the adjustment capacity of sectors and of Member States to common euro-
area output shocks. In particular, it focuses on the role played by country-specific characteristics such as 
product market reforms and openness (to goods and services as well as capital) in improving this adjustment 
capacity. The findings show that, given sectors’ different resilience to shocks, the sectoral composition of the 
economy is an important factor explaining countries’ overall level of cyclical resilience. However, structural 
characteristics of the economy such as product market regulation (PMR) are found to play an even more 
important role. A high level of PMR has a negative impact on resilience. This result helps to better understand 
the reasons behind country differences in the response to shocks and suggest that reducing PMR would help 
improve Member States’ overall cyclical resilience and the cross-country synchronisation of the business cycle.
House price imbalances and structural features of the housing markets 
Historical experience, especially from the latest recession, shows that house price imbalances may have a deep 
impact on the economy as a whole and require close monitoring. The recently adopted Excessive Imbalance 
Procedure (EIP) will involve regular reviews of housing markets in Member States. Against this background 
this section discusses a few structural features of the housing market that may have important implications for 
the sector’s stability. It shows that policies aimed at encouraging housing ownership, especially for the low-
income population, may have a negative impact on house price stability. Establishing a stable and functional 
rental market, particularly for lower-income households, may therefore be seen as beneficial alternative for 
macroeconomic stability. In addition, variable mortgage interest rates, high loan-to-value ratios as well as tax 
incentives for house purchase appear to increase the risk of housing market imbalances.  
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II.1. Internal devaluation and external 
imbalances: a model-based analysis 
Recent developments have highlighted the urgent 
need for some euro-area Member States to restore 
their external balances and to improve their 
competitiveness. While nominal exchange rate 
adjustment is not an available tool for the 
correction of external imbalances in a currency 
union, alternative policies of ‘internal 
devaluation’ can mimic the expenditure-switching 
effects of ‘external’ exchange rate 
devaluation. (27) Internal devaluation policies aim 
to reduce domestic prices either by affecting 
relative export-import prices or by lowering 
domestic production costs and thereby yielding a 
real exchange rate depreciation. An example of 
such internal devaluation is a revenue-neutral shift 
from taxes on labour to taxes on consumption. By 
reducing the tax burden on exports and raising 
that on imports this policy can help to restore 
competitiveness. Likewise, public-sector wage 
moderation may achieve overall wage moderation 
by exerting downward pressure on wages in the 
private sector and thereby reduce firms’ 
production costs and lead to a real exchange rate 
depreciation restoring competitiveness. 
This section analyses the potential effects of these 
policies based on simulations using a three-region 
version of the European Commission’s QUEST 
model: (28) a small euro-area member country, the 
rest of the euro area, and the rest of the world. The 
model includes tradable and non-tradable sectors 
and trade in final goods and intermediate inputs. It 
also distinguishes between private-sector and 
public-sector employment.  
The policy measures analysed are: (i) a tax reform 
shifting government revenue from social security 
contributions towards consumption taxes and 
(ii) a public-sector wage reduction aiming at 
achieving overall labour cost moderation. The rest 
of the section discusses each scenario in more 
details. 
Switching the tax burden from labour to 
consumption 
The first set of scenarios assumes a revenue-
neutral shift from social security contributions 
(SSCs) of firms towards destination-based taxes 
 
                                                        
(27) Calmfors, L. (1998), ‘Macroeconomic policy, wage setting, 
and employment — what difference does the EMU make?’, 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 14, No 3. 
(28) For references, see:  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/research/macroeconomi
c_models_en.htm. 
such as VAT. The reduction in SSCs lowers unit 
labour costs and leads to a reduction in producer 
prices, including for exported goods. This boosts 
foreign demand for exports. At home, higher 
consumption taxes offset the fall in producer 
prices but raise prices on imported goods. Hence, 
the effects are similar to those of an exchange rate 
depreciation and yield an improvement in the 
trade balance. However, in the long run, increased 
consumption taxes are shifted into higher nominal 
wages and real wage costs will return to pre-
reform levels. Therefore, like external exchange 
rate devaluations, the effects on the trade balance 
are not likely to be permanent. 
The scenarios shown in Graph II.1.1 consist of 
reductions in employers’ social security 
contributions of 1 % of (baseline) GDP that are 
compensated by an increase in consumption taxes 
of equal size, such that the reform is ex ante 
budget-neutral. The endogenous improvement in 
fiscal positions from this tax reform due to 
economic expansion can be used for two 
purposes. In the first scenario, the revenues are, in 
the medium term, recycled back into the economy 
through cuts in labour income taxes. These further 
tax reductions give rise to an additional 
expansionary effect while keeping the reform also 
ex post budget-neutral in the very long run. (29) In 
a second scenario there is no further tax reduction 
in the medium term but instead the higher tax 
revenue is used to reduce government debt. (30) 
Without these further reductions in labour taxes, 
the GDP and employment gains are somewhat 
smaller in this second scenario. However, with 
less of a demand stimulus, imports are also more 
negatively affected and the overall improvement 
in the trade balance is therefore more persistent. 
The reduction in wage costs boosts employment 
and GDP increases by 0.35 % after 10 years, but 
by only half that amount when the revenue is used 
to reduce government debt. The tax reform shifts 
taxation from labour to other sources of income 
such as profits/rents, income from financial 
wealth and transfers. Consumption of liquidity-
constrained households declines on impact as 
consumer prices rise, also because transfer and 
unemployment benefit recipients are not 
compensated for the increase in consumption 
taxes in this scenario and face a reduction in their 
disposable income of more than 1 %. 
Consumption of unconstrained households 
                                                        
(29) Technically this is done through a labour tax rule ensuring a 
stable debt-to-GDP ratio at some target in the long run, while 
allowing some deviation in the short and medium run. 
(30) The labour tax rule is turned off for 30 years and then a new 
10 pp lower debt target is imposed in the long run.  
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increases as permanent incomes rise, but in the 
first couple of years the former outweighs the 
latter and aggregate consumption is lower. In the 
medium term, disposable income of wage earners 
increases gradually as wages rise due to higher 
labour demand, and consumption rises. 
As the tax shift leads to lower domestic prices, the 
real interest rate increases and this leads to lower 
investment in the short run. In the medium to long 
run, investment rises above baseline as activity 
expands. However, investment rises by less than 
GDP, due to an increase in relative prices of 
(partially imported) investment goods to the GDP 
deflator, while labour costs fall, leading to 
substitution to more labour-intensive production. 
Graph II.1.1: Switching the tax burden from labour to consumption (deviation from baseline) 
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(1) Main scenario: labour supply elasticity 0.2, no compensation of transfer/benefit recipients; (2) Debt reduction scenario: as baseline 
scenario, but additional revenue used to reduce debt (reduction in long-run debt target); (3) Compensation scenario: labour supply elasticity 
0.2, with compensation of transfer/benefit recipients. 
Source: European Commission, QUEST simulations. 
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Lower export prices raise exports and lower 
domestic prices shift demand towards domestic 
products and away from imported goods (real 
effective depreciation). The competitiveness 
effect is supplemented by the short-run negative 
income effect of the policy, which temporarily 
reduces total and import demand. Imports fall 
both because of increasing relative import prices 
and because of the negative income effect. 
Competitiveness gains and the income effect 
provide a boost to the trade balance of slightly 
over 0.1 % of GDP. In the medium run, the 
improvement in the trade balance gradually 
evaporates as the positive income effect of the 
reform raises imports over time and the 
deterioration of the terms of trade counterbalances 
the impact of the increased net export volume on 
the trade balance. In the second scenario the 
additional tax revenue is used to reduce 
government debt, leading to a smaller positive 
income effect and a more persistent improvement 
in the trade balance, with a consequently larger 
improvement in the net foreign asset position. 
Sensitivity analyses. These scenarios imply sharp 
reductions in real transfers and benefits as 
recipients of these are not compensated for the 
increase in VAT. If they are compensated for the 
increase in consumer prices, as in the third 
scenario in Graph II.1.1, the real benefits of the 
reform are significantly smaller as the costs of 
compensation add a significant burden on fiscal 
positions. Consumption declines by less on impact 
as real disposable incomes fall by less, but the 
increase in transfer and benefit expenditure 
reduces fiscal space and the resulting labour tax 
reduction is smaller. The compensation for 
unemployment benefits also puts upward pressure 
on workers’ wage demands and the reduction in 
wage costs for firms is consequently smaller. The 
first-year GDP impact is slightly larger but 
medium-term output gains are lower than those in 
the first scenario. The trade balance and net 
foreign indebtedness also improve by less as 
consumption is higher in this scenario. 
 
                                                       
The macroeconomic impact of the type of tax 
reforms presented in Graph II.1.1 depends on the 
labour market structure. Sensitivity analysis 
indicates that with a more elastic labour supply a 
similar tax reform leads to a smaller increase in 
real (gross) wages and to a larger rise in 
employment. Thus, with a labour supply elasticity 
of 0.5 instead of the baseline 0.2, real wage costs 
for firms decline by more, long-run employment 
and output effects can double and the gain in the 
NFA-to-GDP ratio would be about 50 % larger. 
Public-sector wage reduction 
A number of euro-area Member States have 
adopted measures to reduce their public wage bill 
in recent years. Wage reductions, wage or hiring 
freezes, and outsourcing of public services have 
been undertaken, e.g. in Spain, Portugal and Italy. 
In other countries, measures to curb public 
expenditure have been taken on an ongoing basis, 
such as in Ireland and Greece, where reductions or 
freezes of public employees’ salaries were 
implemented already in 2009 and followed by 
further consolidation measures in 2010. 
Besides their direct budgetary impact, public-
sector wage reductions can contribute to internal 
devaluations by putting downward pressure on 
private-sector wages and thereby allowing 
domestic price moderation. The resulting gains in 
competitiveness allow the economy’s external 
balance and net foreign asset position to improve. 
The model extension used for these simulations 
disaggregates final government consumption into 
compensation of employees and government 
purchases of goods and services. (31) It is assumed 
that the government chooses the level of public 
employment. Public wages are fixed in a wage 
bargaining process, where a wage mark-up 
captures the bargaining power of public-sector 
employees. Consequently, a public-sector wage 
reduction is captured by a fall in the wage mark-
up in the public sector. The reduction is 
transmitted to the private sector via an increase of 
the labour supply to this sector as households try 
to offset the fall in income from the public 
sector. (32) 
Graph II.1.2 displays the impulse responses of 
selected variables to a permanent 8 % reduction in 
the public-sector mark-up, which implies a 
permanent public-sector wage reduction of around 
9-10 % below the initial baseline in real terms in 
the long run. This amounts to an ex-ante fiscal 
consolidation of around 0.9-1 % of baseline GDP, 
in contrast to the tax shift scenario discussed 
above, which was ex-ante budgetary neutral. 
However, over time, the debt rule with an 
unchanged long-run debt target enforces long-run 
budgetary neutrality. This is achieved by a 
progressive decrease in the labour income tax. 
 
(31) Total government consumption amounted to around 22 % of 
GDP in the euro area in 2010, out of which the compensation 
of public employees accounted for around 10.5 % of GDP. 
(32) The transmission mechanism in the model is fully 
endogenous. It does not rely on a more direct signalling role 
of the government on private wage setting. 
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Graph II.1.2: Public-sector wage reduction (deviation from baseline) 
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(1) Main scenario: debt rule switched on; (2) Debt reduction scenario: debt rule switched off, change in long-run debt target. 
Source: European Commission, QUEST simulations. 
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The simulations confirm the spillover of the 
public wage reduction to the private sector. In 
contrast to the impact of the tax reform, this 
policy measure leads to a long-lasting (although 
relatively small) private wage moderation of 
around 0.3 %. 
The public wage reduction affects the economy 
directly through the fall in employees’ labour 
income (contractionary effect) and indirectly 
through the downward pressure on private-sector 
production costs (expansionary effect). The 
simulations suggest that the expansionary effect 
dominates over the medium term: private and total 
employment, private-sector output, investment 
and household consumption all increase in 
response to the policy under the baseline scenario. 
In the short run, however, domestic demand as 
well as private output fall below their baseline 
levels. 
The public wage reduction affects relative trade 
prices and trade volumes via declining domestic 
production costs. The simulations show that the 
real effective exchange rate depreciates by around 
0.5 % after 3 years. 
The real depreciation leads to an expansion in 
export volumes. At the same time, the falling 
export prices dampen the resulting improvement 
in external balances in value terms. Imports 
decline in the short run but then tend to increase 
over time along with increasing domestic demand. 
In spite of the permanent wage reduction, the 
overall impact of the public wage reduction on the 
external balances is fairly modest: the 10 % wage 
reduction in the public sector is found to lead to a 
transitory improvement in the trade balance, with 
a peak of around 0.2 % of GDP translating into an 
improvement in the NFA-to-GDP ratio by around 
0.8 % after ten years. 
 
                                                       
Sensitivity analyses. The baseline wage reduction 
scenario assumes no change in the long-run 
government debt target and allows the labour 
income tax to be progressively reduced. This 
allows an additional reduction in firms’ labour 
cost which per se contributes to the gain in 
competitiveness and the improvement in the 
external position. 
If the public wage reduction is not recycled 
through a labour tax cut but is used instead to 
reduce the public debt, the gains in the external 
balances achieved by the wage reduction turn out 
to be markedly larger. This is because the 
domestic expansion is, in that case, curtailed by 
the uncompensated fall in wages. Lower domestic 
demand leads to a steeper fall in prices (real 
depreciation) and a more persistent fall in imports 
and hence to a much more persistent improvement 
in the trade balance than otherwise (see dashed 
line in Graph II.1.2). (33) This, however, comes at 
the cost of persistently lower household 
consumption and investment. 
As in the case of the tax-shift scenarios, the 
results of the public-sector wage reduction 
scenarios depend on the structure of the labour 
market. The propagation of the public-sector 
wage moderation is also contingent on the labour 
market structure. When labour supply reacts more 
sensitively to changes in wages, the same 10 % 
public wage moderation is more strongly 
transmitted to private wages and thereby amplifies 
the gain in competitiveness. In particular, with 
higher labour supply elasticity, the transmission of 
the public wage moderation to private wages 
could even double. External balances would also 
improve more, though their improvement is 
somewhat dampened by increasingly deteriorating 
terms of trade. The NFA-to-GDP ratio is found to 
improve by around 1.2 % of GDP after ten 
years. (34) 
Relationship with the economic literature. The 
results of the model simulations presented in this 
section are broadly in line with recent findings in 
the macroeconomic literature. Evidence presented 
in a number of empirical studies supports the 
interaction between private and public wages. 
Positive co-movement between private and public 
wages, as established in the QUEST model, is 
reported e.g. by Afonso and Gomes (2008), Lamo, 
Pérez and Schuknecht (2008) for OECD countries 
and Holm-Hadulla et al. (2010) for the euro 
area. (35) The above-cited papers as well as Pérez 
and Sanchez (2010) also agree on the bidirectional 
causal relationship between wages in both sectors. 
Most evidence suggests causality runs from the 
 
(33) Technically this is done by switching off the debt rule for the 
first 20 years of the simulation and by reducing the debt 
target by 20 pp in the long run. 
(34) The baseline scenario assumes a labour supply elasticity of 
0.2. This alternative scenario is based on an elasticity of 0.5 
instead. 
(35) Afonso, A. and P. Gomes (2008), ‘Interactions between 
private and public sector wages’, ECB Working Paper Series, 
No 971; Lamo, A., J. Pérez and L. Schuknecht (2008), 
‘Public and private sector wages: Co-movement and 
causality’, ECB Working Paper Series, No 963; Holm-
Hadulla, F., K. Kamath, A. Lamo, J. Pérez and L Schuknecht 
(2010), ‘Public wages in the euro area: Towards securing 
stability and competitiveness’, ECB Occasional Paper Series, 
No 112. 
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private to the public sector; nevertheless, public 
wages may take the lead in many instances. 
In addition, there is also broad agreement among 
these studies that public wage moderation is 
transmitted to private wages and also has a 
stimulating impact on private employment by 
orders of magnitude similar to those found in our 
simulations. The implications for total 
employment and further propagation to the 
economy depend, however, on the specific policy 
measure as well as on the modelling assumptions; 
see Finn (1998), Pappa (2003), Ardagna (2007), 
Quadrini and Trigari (2008) and Gomes 
(2010). (36) 
To the best of our knowledge, there are no 
empirical studies on the effect of public 
employment policies on external (im)balances. 
However, the relationship between a broader set 
of fiscal policies and external balances is also 
supported by empirical evidence. Using a broad 
database, Abbas et al. (2010) estimate that a fiscal 
expansion of 1 % of GDP worsens the current 
account by 0.2-0.3 % of GDP. (37) The impulse 
responses generated by the QUEST model predict 
very similar magnitudes. In another study, Nickel 
and Vansteenkiste (2008) also establish a positive 
relationship between fiscal deficits and current 
account deficits. According to their estimations, 
however, the strength (and the presence) of this 
relationship depends on the public debt level. (38) 
Concluding remarks 
The results presented in this section show that the 
effects of nominal exchange rate devaluations can 
be mimicked by internal devaluations, which can 
lead to similar expenditure switching from foreign 
to domestic output. 
 
(36) Finn, M. (1998), ‘Cyclical effects of government’s 
employment and goods purchases’, International Economic 
Review, Vol. 39, No 3; Pappa, E. (2004), ‘New Keynesian or 
RBC transmission? The effects of fiscal policy in labour 
markets’, IGIER Working Paper, No 293; Ardagna, S. 
(2007), ‘Fiscal policy in unionised labour markets’, Journal 
of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 31, No 5, pp. 1498-
1534; Quadrini, V. and A. Trigari (2008),‘Public employment 
and the business cycle’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 109, No 4, pp. 723-742; Gomes, P. (2010), ‘Fiscal 
policy and the labour market: The effects of public sector 
employment and wages’, mimeo, London School of 
Economics. 
(37) Abbas, A., J. Bouhga-Hagbe, A. Fatás, P. Mauro, and R. 
Velloso (2010),‘Fiscal policy and the current account’, IMF 
Working Paper, No 10/121. 
(38) Nickel, C. and I. Vansteenkiste (2008),‘Fiscal policies, the 
current account and Ricardian equivalence’, ECB Working 
Paper Series, No 935. 
Internal devaluation measures, such as a tax shift 
from labour to consumption or public-sector wage 
moderation, increase trade competitiveness by 
reducing domestic production costs and hence 
improve external balances over the short term. 
The decline in relative domestic tradable prices is 
similar to the competitiveness effect of nominal 
exchange rate devaluations. Moreover, permanent 
internal devaluation measures have a long-lasting 
impact on competitiveness (real effective 
depreciation), contrary to permanent nominal 
exchange rate devaluation, where the effect is 
only transitory (nominal depreciation passes 
through into higher prices of intermediate imports 
and raises production costs and prices at horizons 
over which these are flexible). 
However, the long-lasting competitiveness gain 
from a permanent internal devaluation measure 
does not result in a permanent improvement in the 
trade balance. The tax shift from labour to 
consumption and public-sector wage moderation 
boost GDP and employment over time, translating 
into higher domestic and (with unchanged 
preferences) import demand. The positive income 
effect of internal devaluation largely offsets the 
improvement in the trade balance over the longer 
horizon. 
Supplementing internal devaluations with fiscal 
consolidation reinforces the positive trade-balance 
effect over the short and medium term. Internal 
devaluation acts mainly through the supply-side 
channel, i.e. lower production costs and tradable 
prices. Fiscal consolidation adds negative demand 
effects (lower public-sector demand, higher 
taxes), which reduce domestic and import demand 
and weaken and/or delay the positive income 
effect of the supply-side measures. The result 
illustrates that a long-lasting rebalancing of 
external accounts crucially depends on the 
rebalancing of domestic demand.  
Overall, the effects of internal devaluations on 
external balances are similar to those of external 
exchange rate devaluations, which also have 
positive effects on trade in the short run, but do 
not lead to permanent trade-balance 
improvements in the long run. 
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II.2. Sectoral implications of external 
rebalancing 
Introduction 
It is now recognised that amongst the various 
macroeconomic imbalances that have built up in 
some parts of the euro area since the inception of 
EMU, external imbalances are among the most 
challenging and pervasive from a policy 
perspective. Through their bearing on external 
liabilities, current account deficits are an 
important determinant of country credit risk and 
financial stability risks. Yet, being the result of 
complex interactions between public and private 
sector investment and saving decisions, they 
evade direct policy control.  
In the previous decade, the euro area has seen the 
build up of large and very persistent current 
account deficits in some of its Member States. By 
curbing credit-driven excess demand, the global 
economic and financial crisis appears to be 
progressively correcting these imbalances in most 
if not all the Member States concerned. This 
section looks at an often-neglected dimension of 
the rebalancing process: its relationship with an 
economy's industrial structure. It argues that 
rebalancing is associated with important industrial 
shifts of the economy's supply side that have 
important policy implications.  
 
The mechanics of external rebalancing 
The current account records economic 
transactions between its residents and non-
residents linked to export and import activity, 
while also capturing investment earnings and 
current transfers. A current account deficit 
represents the excess of domestic demand over 
income or, alternatively, the excess of investment 
over domestic saving. Depending on its 
magnitude and persistence, a current account 
deficit can mark a temporary period of large 
investment needs, for instance following a natural 
disaster or during a phase of 'catch-up' growth, but 
it may also be symptomatic of an economy that is 
persistently outspending its earning capacity.  
Graph II.2.1 presents an overview of euro-area 
Member States' net foreign asset position (NFA) 
as well as latest and prospective current account 
balances. As the current account balance is 
approximately equal to the annual change in a 
country's NFA, the graph also conveys medium-
term trajectories for Member States' net external 
liabilities. (39) A number of countries of the 
periphery of the euro area stand out as having 
comparatively high net foreign liabilities (PT, EL, 
IE, ES, EE). All of these countries are due to 
achieve a major reduction of the current account 
between 20007 and 2012, with Graph II.2.1 
showing particularly strong corrections in PT and 
EL between 2010 and 2012. Although the 
rebalancing process may still have some way to 
go in some Member States, it is clearly taking 
place.  
Graph II.2.1: Net financial asset position and 
current accounts, euro area Member States  
(% GDP) (1) 
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(1) A negative NFA figure indicates a net liability position vis-à-
vis the rest of the world. 
Source: Commission services. 
Patterns of adjustment of large current account 
deficits have recently been analysed extensively, 
emphasising in particular possible consequences 
for growth and on the respective roles of demand 
and prices. (40) An aspect which seems, however, 
to have been somewhat neglected is the sectoral 
and supply-side dimension. Current account 
imbalances can in fact be associated with supply 
distortions – in the form of skews in the sectoral 
composition of the economy – which need to be 
reversed during the adjustment phase.  
The basic explanation for these sectoral shifts is 
as follows. Large current account deficits 
essentially reflect an excess of demand over 
supply. These demand pressures cause price 
tensions and an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate. The magnitude of the price changes differs, 
                                                        
(39) This approximation holds if there are no major valuation 
effects, debt cancellations, write-offs, reclassifications or 
errors and omissions. In this case, adding the current account 
balance to the previous year's NFA position gives the new 
NFA. 
(40) See for instance European Commission (2010), "A look at 
past episodes of current account adjustment", Quarterly 
Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 9 No. 3.  
Algieri, B. and T. Bracke (2007) ‘Patterns of current account 
adjustments — insights from past experience’, CESifo 
Working Paper, No 2029.  
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however, across sectors leading to changes in 
relative prices. In particular, price increases are 
likely to be higher in the non-tradable sector than 
in the tradable sector where competition from 
imports tends to constrain producers' pricing 
behaviour. The ensuing rise in the relative price of 
non-tradables induces investors to move to that 
sector, entailing a reallocation of the economy's 
capital and labour resources. The skew in the 
economy's production structure towards non-
tradables is all the more likely if the current 
account deficit persists over several years and 
therefore leaves enough time for supply forces to 
respond to the changes in price signals.  
Two arguments suggest that sectoral skew 
resulting from the mechanics described above is 
likely to be stronger for a country in a monetary 
union. First, evidence from the first decade of the 
euro indicates that large current account deficits 
are easier to sustain over long periods of time in a 
monetary union, leading to long cycles of excess 
demand and giving more time for presumably 
slow sectoral shifts to take place.  
Second, a country-specific cyclical boom is likely 
to be associated with comparatively stronger 
demand pressures in the non-tradable sector in a 
member of a monetary union due to an asymmetry 
in the adjustment process. In a country running its 
own monetary policy, the typical response to a 
cyclical upswing involves a policy tightening that 
affects both tradable and non-tradable activities. 
By contrast, in a monetary union, a bigger part of 
the adjustment to a country-specific cyclical 
upswing is market-based. This is the so-called 
competitiveness channel: excessive demand 
pressures push up inflation above the monetary 
union's average, leading to a steady appreciation 
of the real exchange rate which progressively 
cools off the economy by curbing exports and 
fuelling imports. Hence, the adjustment tends to 
weigh more on the tradable than on the non-
tradable sector, an asymmetry that is likely to 
reinforce shifts in capital and labour from the 
tradable to the non-tradable sector.  
 
                                                       
Overall, current account rebalancing processes 
require improvements in competitiveness but also 
a reversal of the sectoral skew on the supply side 
accumulated during the boom phase. As demand 
pressures fade, demand for domestic goods 
weakens and domestic prices need to adjust 
downwards to curb excess supply. Excess supply 
will be particularly large for non-tradables, calling 
either for larger price falls in that sector and/or a 
reallocation of supply from non-tradable to 
tradable. In the absence of appropriate price 
adjustment and/or sectoral shifts in labour and 
capital, the current account rebalancing will give 
rise to a lasting increase in unemployment.  
An interesting implication of this analysis is that 
price and sectoral adjustment can be seen as 
complementary forces in current account 
rebalancing processes. The size of the price 
adjustment needed to bring current account back 
to equilibrium without excess supply depends on 
the magnitude of the resource reallocation 
process. The more easily resources are moved 
from the non-tradable to the tradable sector, the 
smaller the required competitiveness gains. Some 
model simulations indicate that this 
complementarity may be significant. (41) 
Sectoral skews were clearly visible in some 
Member States in pre-crisis years 
In the pre-crisis decade a confluence of economic 
tailwinds spurred domestic demand growth and 
expanded private sector balance sheets across the 
euro area, particularly in the periphery. The most 
prominent manifestation of this was the rapid 
house price appreciation and strong rise in 
construction and residential investment in ES and 
IE, which distorted these economies' industrial 
structure. The following two graphs show output 
developments for the five euro-area Member 
States exhibiting the largest net external liabilities 
("EXT-5" – IE, EL, ES, EE, PT) with a view to 
detecting wider sectoral imbalances in economic 
activity over the past decade. (42) 
A marked divergence in output growth is evident 
both between countries and within countries' 
tradable and non-tradable sectors. The euro area 
(EA17) depicted in Graph II.2.3 serves as an 
overall benchmark and shows even but slow 
output growth across the non-tradable and 
tradable sectors, with the crisis impact visible in a 
much sharper decline in tradable than non-
tradable output in 2009. By contrast, most of the 
Member States of the periphery depicted in graphs 
II.2.2 and II.2.3 experienced rather different 
 
(41) See e.g. Engler, P., M. Fidora and C. Thimann (2009), 
‘External imbalances and the US current account: How 
supply-side changes affect an exchange rate adjustment’, 
Review of International Economics 17(5), 2009, p. 927-941. 
(42) The industrial division follows the conventional grouping of 
ISIC codes A-E as tradable, and codes F-P as non-tradable. 
Due to the resulting treatment of comparatively tradable 
services such as wholesale and transport as non-tradable this 
will tend to underestimate tradable output, although the 
findings of this section are generally robust to the choice of 
tradability definition. 
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developments in the run-up to the crisis and 
thereafter. 
Graph II.2.2: Real gross value added, selected 
countries (2000=100, 1996-2010) 
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
IE tradable IE non-tradable
PT tradable PT non-tradable
EL tradable EL non-tradable
Source: Commission services. 
 
 
Graph II.2.3: Real gross value added, selected 
countries (2000=100, 1996-2010) (cont'd) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Firstly, output growth was significantly faster in 
Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Estonia and Spain than 
in the euro area prior to the crisis, though with a 
sharper fall thereafter. Secondly, a number of 
countries (IE, ES, EL) experienced considerably 
faster growth in their non-tradables sector than for 
tradables.(43) Thirdly, a number of the selected 
Member States (IE, EL, EE) recorded a 
comparatively stronger fall in nontradable output 
in the crisis period of 2009-2010 than for 
tradables, unlike the euro area aggregate, which 
only saw falls in tradable output. These falls in 
non-tradable output in the EXT-5 are indicative of 
sectoral rebalancing processes already at work. 
Based on this prima facie evidence, it does appear 
                                                        
                                                       
(43) For Greece the attribution of wholesale & retail trade (G51-
G52) and shipping & telecoms (I61& I64) is pivotal, as these 
jointly doubled in size between 2000 and 2007. For all the 
other above countries the tradability definition does not affect 
the picture.  
that at least in Spain, Greece and Ireland a 
pronounced boom in non-tradable output occurred 
in the pre-crisis years.   
The role of construction activity in explaining the 
nontradable boom in the periphery is 
considerable, but by no means accounts for all of 
it: construction and other non-tradable output in 
the EXT-5 rose in lockstep up to the crisis, at rates 
well above tradable output. It is however true that 
the crisis-induced contraction in the EXT-5 group 
has been particularly sharp in the construction 
sector.  
Overall, these findings suggests that a stronger 
concentration of productive resources took place 
in nontradables in the EXT-5, thus invariably 
constraining tradable growth and limiting 
potential exports. To the extent that non-tradable 
output has fallen permanently since the crisis in 
countries such as Ireland, the ensuing relative 
price falls in the nontradable sector should boost 
tradable production.  
Implications for employment  
The analysis has important implications for the 
labour markets of Member States undergoing a 
major current account rebalancing. The EXT-5 
countries experienced markedly faster growth in 
non-tradable employment than the EA17 in the 
pre-crisis years (see Graph II.2.4), also saw a 
faster rise in the share of non-tradable in total 
employment than the rest of the euro area. Current 
account adjustment economies will thus need to 
reallocate a significant share of employment from 
the non-tradable to the tradable sector in the years 
to come. Graph II.2.4 shows marked falls in hours 
worked in the nontradable sector of the EXT-5 in 
2009 and 2010, suggesting that this labour 
reallocation process has started already.  
The required labour reallocation process will not 
necessarily be smooth and easy. Companies' 
labour demand may differ significantly between 
the tradable and non-tradable sectors, notably in 
terms of required skills and qualifications and in 
terms of job location. This implies a risk of lasting 
mismatches between supply and demand. The 
emergence of such mismatches could be one of 
the explanations of the apparent disconnection 
between inflation and unemployment observed in 
some peripheral Member States. (44) In these 
Member States surges in unemployment rates 
 
(44) Other possible key explanations include downward rigidities 
in prices and wages and a sharp cyclical drop in labour 
productivity during the recession. 
- 30 -
II. Special topics on the euro-area economy 
have so far led to only modest deceleration in 
inflation. (45) This disconnect is also reflected in 
the European Commission estimates of the 
NAIRU which point to significant rises in labour 
market frictions in some Member States over 
2010-12 (see Graph II.2.5). A small impact of 
unemployment on inflation implies that 
competitiveness rebalancing in current account 
deficit countries is slow. 
Graph II.2.4: Total hours worked in non-tradable 
sector (2000=100, 2000-2010) 
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Source: Commission services. 
If not properly addressed, mismatches between 
labour supply and demand also raise the risk of a 
permanent rise in unemployment thereby 
transforming the original external imbalance into 
an internal imbalance. Obviously, the risk of 
mismatches turning into permanent 
unemployment depends on the quality of labour 
market institutions and can be reduced by policies 
facilitating labour mobility, skills improvement or 
vocational training. As discussed in detail in 
Box II.2.1, an additional factor is migration. This 
may come as a surprise insofar as the euro area is 
usually seen as a region where, contrary to the 
US, migration plays virtually no role in 
adjustment to asymmetric country shocks. But, 
while this may have been true in the distant past, 
migration has clearly played a role in reducing 
unemployment differences in Europe in recent 
years. This is exemplified by the case of Ireland 
and Spain, where migration inflows reduced 
labour market tensions during the boom years and 
outflows are now cushioning the rise in 
unemployment. Besides these two countries, the 
box presents econometric analysis pointing to a 
negative relationship between net migration and 
unemployment in the EU and the euro area. 
                                                        
(45) The rise in taxes and other administrated prices in the context 
of fiscal consolidation strategies are another push factor for 
inflation. 
Graph II.2.5: NAIRU, euro-area Member States 
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Implications for investment  
Successful external rebalancing will not only 
depend on labour reallocation but also on capital 
redeployment. Capital reallocation across sectors 
can take two main forms. Firstly, gross capital 
investment can flow into different industries over 
time, thus affecting the capital stock via 
incremental flow changes. Secondly, existing 
physical capital may in principle be sold or leased 
between industries, although the extent to which a 
significant second-hand market for productive 
capital exists is likely to vary greatly between 
industries and countries. (46) Overall, this implies 
that major sectoral reallocations of productive 
capital will occur in an incremental way, and in 
periods of tight credit conditions this potentially 
slow process may take even longer.  
Abstracting from differences in depreciation rates, 
changes in an industry's capital stock can only 
take place incrementally through these two 
channels, so that gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF) becomes a key variable of interest when 
identifying sectoral reallocation. Total GFCF 
flows have shown a clear cyclical element over 
the past decade and a half for the euro area as a 
whole, but for the EXT-5 this has been far more 
pronounced, where GFCF more than doubled in 
volume terms between the mid-nineties and 2007. 
The subsequent strong decline was also far more 
marked for the EXT-5, sending average annual 
investment back to its 2000 level.   
While a housing boom certainly represents a non-
tradable boom from a supply-side perspective, it  
                                                        
(46) Anecdotal evidence suggests that the market for second hand 
productive assets may be large in the case of vehicles, but 
less so in the case of machinery or even entire plants. 
Second-hand capital trade further appears to display a strong 
cross-border pattern, being typically sold from advanced 
industrialised countries to lesser-developed industrial nations.  
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Box II.2.1: Adjustment via migration
This box looks at international migration as an adjustment channel to imbalances on labour markets in the euro area. 
Differences in unemployment rates between countries could play a role in migration decisions allowing migration 
from high-unemployment countries to low-unemployment countries to reduce labour market imbalances and 
differences in unemployment across countries. 
In the US, migration has been a major factor in adjustment to region-specific shocks. In an influential paper 
Blanchard and Katz (1992) find that, in the US, shocks to unemployment at the state level last about half a decade 
and are overcome mainly via migration. (1) In Europe labour mobility is lower and unemployment rate differentials 
persist longer. However, despite the relatively low degree of mobility of workers so far, mobility among European 
countries might play a bigger role in the future due to a number of reasons, including falling transport costs, the 
elimination of remaining restrictions to within-EU labour mobility, and the fact that a larger stock of EU residents 
are recent migrants, who typically exhibit a higher degree of mobility compared to incumbent residents.  
Data show that migration has played a big role in some euro-area countries during the previous decade. Net inward 
migration as a share of the original population between 2000 and 2009 was the highest among EU countries in 
Spain, with an average gain of 12% of the population (see graph below). Luxembourg, Cyprus and Ireland were 
only slightly behind, with gains in population due to migration of about 11% for the two former and 8% for the 
latter. Over the decade, the biggest population losses from migration were registered in Bulgaria and Romania which 
lost around 3% of population each. Losses were also recorded in Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. The financial crisis 
has contributed to contain or even reverse these trends. In Spain, net inward migration has declined drastically but 
has so far remained positive (on the basis of 2009 data). Meanwhile, net migration flows in Ireland have moved 
from inflows to outflows. 
Net Migration 2000-2009 in % of population 
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As expected on the basis of economic theory, the recent developments in Spain and Ireland are associated with 
widening unemployment rate differences with the remainder of the EU. The graphs below shows a clear negative 
co-movement in these two countries between net migration (per 1000 inhabitants) and the unemployment gap with 
the rest of the EU (the population- weighted unemployment rate in the other 26 Member States).  
Net migration rate and the unemployment rate difference with the EU for Spain and Ireland 
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Source: Eurostat and own calculations. 
                                                          
(1) Blanchard, O. and L. Katz (1992), "Regional Evolutions", Brooking Papers in Economic Activity 
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may not necessarily affect other non-tradable 
sectors. Stripping out housing investment from 
non-tradable investment in order to test for wider 
shifts towards non-tradables, a comparison with 
the euro area reveals no trend rise in non-housing 
non-tradable investment between 2000 and 2006 
for the EXT-5, with a jump visible only from 
2007 onwards. (47) By contrast, the euro area 
shows a moderate trend rise over the pre-crisis 
period. (48)  
 
(47) This jump is principally driven by strong rises in transport 
and communication investment in IE, EL and EE. 
Box (continued) 
 
In order to investigate to what extent increased unemployment dispersion within Europe can induce a correction in 
net migration flows, we estimate a migration equation and use the predictions from the estimated equation as a 
benchmark. The equation is estimated on an unbalanced panel of 22 EU countries (all EU except BG, RO, PL; EE 
and CZ) over the 1991-2009 period. Net migration rates are regressed on the difference in the unemployment rate 
and in the real wage to the rest of the EU. Time fixed effects are introduced to control for factors that affect net 
migration over time. The regression therefore exploits the cross-sectional dimension of the data. The prediction from 
the estimated equation can be interpreted as the net migration rate prevailing over the long term (i.e. abstracting 
from short-term adjustment costs) on the basis of the unemployment and the wage gap. The regression results (see 
table below) show a relationship between net migration and the unemployment and wage gap which is statistically 
significant. As would be expected, having a lower unemployment rate than the EU average is associated with a 
higher net migration rate, while having higher relative real wages is also associated with higher net migration. 
Estimation of a migration equation 
Dependent variable  Net migration rate  
Explanatory variables Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
Unemployment rate difference with EU -0.25 *** (0.07) 
Real wage difference with EU 0.07 *** (0.02) 
Year dummies not shown  
Observations 340  
Number of countries 22  
R- squared 0.21  
     Source: Commission services. 
The regression results can be used to predict net migration rates for 2009 and 2010 and compare them to the actual 
net migration rates in 2009. The graph below shows that in Ireland, where net migration turned negative in 2009, the 
migration equation predicts still positive net migration in 2009 and 2010 albeit with a negative trend. This suggests 
that the labour market adjustment via net migration in Ireland was relatively quick, and stronger than expected on 
the basis of economic fundamentals. A relatively fast outward migration adjustment compared with the estimated 
equation is recorded also for Lithuania and Malta. Conversely, a comparatively strong inward migration adjustment 
seems to have taken place in Luxemburg, Belgium, Slovenia and Sweden. In other countries, net migration flows in 
2009 appear instead to have been lower. In Spain net migration was positive in 2009 while the equation would have 
suggested a net outflow. The net outward migration adjustment was also below what is predicted by the equation in 
Greece. In Germany and the Netherlands inward migration was below what could have been expected on the basis 
of fundamentals.  
Actual net migration rate 2009, predicted net migration rate 2009 and 2010 
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Source: Commission services 
 
Overall, the fall in net migration observed in Spain and Ireland following strong rises in unemployment relative to 
the rest of the euro area shows the role that migration can play in equalising unemployment rate differences across 
the EU and the euro area. The estimated negative relationship between net migration and unemployment in a 
migration equation confirms the role of migration.  
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Conclusion Graph II.2.6: Share of housing investment in total 
GFCF, volumes, % 
Large and persistent current account deficits can 
be associated with a shift of the economy's 
production structure towards the non-tradable 
sector. In that case, in addition to the well known 
demand and real exchange rate adjustment 
challenges, current account rebalancing processes 
also require a reallocation of labour and capital 
from the non-tradable to the tradable sector. 
Evidence shows that euro-area Member States 
that have accumulated large current account 
deficits in pre-crisis years have indeed 
experienced such a supply shift and but that the 
supply reallocation process still has some way to 
go. The need for this reallocation raises risks of 
mismatch between supply and demand of labour 
that could make part of the surge in 
unemployment observed since the beginning of 
the crisis long-lasting. To counter these risks 
policies should aim at facilitating labour mobility 
across sectors and the reallocation of capital 
towards the tradable sector.  
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Source: Eurostat 
Overall, this should be taken as prima facie 
evidence of the non-tradables boom in the EXT-5 
Member States with external imbalances having 
been driven to a significant extent by housing 
market developments. Furthermore, the sharp 
decline in housing investment in these countries 
following the preceding 10-year boom illustrates 
that investment flows may well switch quickly 
between sectors, although this will only 
incrementally and gradually support supply-side-
driven rebalancing via sectoral capital stocks. 
 
                                                                                  
(48) In view of wider indications (e.g. section 3) of there having 
been no marked sectoral imbalances for the EA17 as a whole 
this may simply reflect different investment intensities 
between the tradable and non-tradable sector. 
II. Special topics on the euro-area economy 
II.3. Sectoral resilience to shocks 
Introduction 
Economic policy has two general goals: growth 
and stability. Growth aims to maximise living 
standards (income net of social and environmental 
costs) and stability aims to minimise fluctuations 
(booms and busts) in income, employment and 
prices in the short and medium term. The two 
goals are not independent since long-term growth 
is likely to be higher in a stable environment. 
Resilience to shocks – i.e. the capacity of the 
economy to weather shocks with limited output 
losses - is crucial for macroeconomic stability. At 
firm level, resilience means the ability of 
enterprises to avoid bankruptcy or significant 
losses during economic downturns, thanks to 
prompt adjustment of their production technology, 
product characteristics, trade linkages, 
employment regimes, etc. At sectoral level, 
resilience means low responsiveness of sectoral 
output to shocks. It is supported by low entry and 
exit barriers that facilitate a more efficient 
reallocation of resources. The flexibility of firms 
and openness of sectors translates into low co-
movements between sectoral output changes and 
aggregate common shocks. The current crisis 
shows that in a monetary union, the inability of 
countries to smoothly adjust to asymmetric shocks 
or to common shocks with asymmetric effects can 
be very costly. 
 
                                                       
The latest recession has demonstrated how 
important the policies supporting resilience are 
and, in particular, has brought to the forefront of 
public discussion the role that structural reforms 
can play. Adjustment channels other than the 
exchange rate are particularly important for euro-
area countries, which, without national monetary 
and thus exchange rate policy, need to rely on the 
smooth and proper functioning of other 
adjustment mechanisms. Regulations that 
facilitate adjustment in firms have an important 
role to play in this respect. Understanding the 
reasons behind euro-area countries’ different 
resilience to shocks is a first step in identifying 
how to improve it, and taking into account 
countries’ sectoral composition and the various 
sectors’ different adjustment capacity to shocks 
could shed some light on the matter. This section 
examines the adjustment capacity, or resilience, of 
industrial sectors in the euro area to common 
shocks and describes the role that institutional 
factors and, in particular, product market 
regulations, play in this adjustment process. (49) 
Methodology 
The starting point of the analysis is the 
identification of sector-level business cycles in the 
EU countries that are then confronted with 
common euro-area GDP shocks. The focus is on 
‘classical’ cycles, i.e. fluctuations of output levels 
(rather than variations in ‘output gaps’). 
Resilience is defined as a low impact of common 
shocks on sectoral output cycles, and it is 
measured as the conditional correlation between 
sectoral output changes (over sectoral business 
cycle phases) and common disturbances (see 
Box 1 for more details). Common disturbances 
are defined as euro-area shocks that are derived 
from a small euro-area VAR model. Regression 
analysis is used to estimate resilience and how it 
is affected by product market regulations 
(measured by the OECD product market 
regulation composite indicator, PMR) and other 
structural variables such as the level of financial 
development (measured by the equity market 
capitalisation to GDP ratio), trade openness and 
participation in EMU. The industry sector is the 
focus of the econometric work and the analysis is 
carried out for 21 industry sub-sectors (2-digit 
NACE). The analysis of quarterly data is 
undertaken for the period 1980-2008, and 
separately for the period 2008-2010Q2. 
In theory, countries’ product market regulation 
could be expected to have a negative effect on 
resilience as stricter regulations reduce the ability 
to adapt to shocks; however, strict regulations 
could also be working as a form of protectionism 
insulating inefficient sectors from shocks. 
Likewise, the level of financial development and 
trade openness could have a positive, but also a 
negative, effect on resilience. Highly integrated 
economies, from a financial and a trade point of 
view, could be more exposed to external shocks 
and therefore show less resilience. On the other 
hand, a high level of financial development and 
trade openness may positively affect resilience 
because the indicators could also capture easy 
access to financial markets (resulting e.g. in 
consumption smoothing and smaller fluctuations 
of investment), and the fact that more open 
economies tend to be more efficient, competitive 
and can recover quicker thanks to foreign demand 
 
(49) The section relies heavily on a recent study commissioned by 
the European Commission on the subject: Canova, F., L. 
Coutinho and Z. Kontolemis (2011), ‘Product market reforms 
and adjustment in the European economy’.  
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Box II.3.1: An econometric framework to estimate industrial sectors' resilience to common shocks
This box presents the methodology developed in Canova et al. (2011) to estimate industrial sectors' resilience to 
common shocks.  
To measure sectoral business cycle amplitudes, sectoral turning points, i.e. peaks and troughs, are identified applying
the Bry-Boschan method. (1) Alternatively, where that procedure does not identify turning points, the simple two-
consecutive-change rule is used: a recession (expansion) starts if there are at least two-consecutive quarter declines 
(increases) in output. Subsequently, a measure of sectoral output change (cycles) capturing both intensity and
persistence (taking into account differences in the length of adjustment) (Y~ ) is constructed for each sector i, country 
j, and business cycle phase k, based on the following formula:  
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where Y is quarterly output, α = 1 for upturns and −1 for downturns and n denotes the number of quarters from trough 
to peak.  
A structural VAR is employed to construct the main explanatory variable: the common euro-area shocks (S in the 
formula below). Common output shocks are defined as the change in output that cannot be predicted using 
information contained in current and past values of interest rates, broad money supply, prices, and past values of
output itself. (2) The reason why only common disturbances are considered, is to better isolate differences in the 
adjustment capacity of sectors. This would not be possible if, for example, sector-specific idiosyncratic disturbances 
were employed.  
Then, series of GDP shocks associated with each sectoral business cycle k and country are constructed. For this, the 
common GDP shocks (structural residuals, e in the equation below) have been normalised and their changes
cumulated across quarters (t) for each sector i, country j, and earlier identified sectoral business cycle phase k. The 
cumulative sum of shocks can be also seen as a difference between the residuals at the end and at the beginning of the
business cycle phase k: 
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Standard econometric techniques are then used to estimate the responsiveness of sectoral output changes ( ijkY
~
) to 
(normalised) shocks ( ijkS ) and to relate sectoral resilience to product market regulation and other important sectoral
and national characteristics, such as openness or financial development. 
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where β0 is a vector of sector-specific effects; D is a matrix of dummy variables, controlling for certain sector,
country or phase cycle characteristics. For example, it includes EMU membership and a dummy allowing for
asymmetric responses to shocks for upturns and downturns. Z is a vector of country characteristics that are expected
to affect the transmission mechanism of shocks, such as financial development indicators, trade openness and
debt. (3) Finally, PMR is countries' product market regulation, which is expected to affect resilience to shocks and is 
the main focus of interest of the analysis. (4) 
                                                          
(1) Emulating the analytical process of the NBER and, to some extent, CEPR business cycle dating committees. 
(2) As an alternative, the authors also apply the Blanchard and Quah (1989) identification method which imposes long-term 
restrictions to distinguish between permanent and transitory shocks. The negative link between product market regulations and 
resilience is detected for permanent shocks,  Blanchard, O. and D. Quah (1989), “The dynamic effects of aggregate demand 
and supply disturbances”, American Economic Review, Vol. 79, No. 4, pp. 655-673. 
(3) Financial development (market capitalization to GDP ratio), debt-to-GDP ratio and trade openness are averages over the 
period 1995-2008. 
(4) OECD product market regulation composite indicators for 1998, 2003, and 2008.  
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in the economies not suffering from the recession 
(e.g. emerging countries). 
Main results 
The regression results show that product market 
regulations negatively impact the resilience of 
industrial sectors. (50) This finding is in line with 
the effects generally predicted in the literature. 
Ahn (2002) argued that all components of firms’ 
efficiency (allocative, productive, and dynamic) 
are likely to be adversely affected if product 
markets are highly regulated. The liberalisation of 
product markets usually improves allocative 
efficiency (quicker reallocation of resources to 
more productive firms and sectors) by facilitating 
entry and exit and increasing the contestability of 
markets (Melitz, 2003). In addition, product 
market reforms aimed at increasing competition 
can lead to an increase in price and wage 
flexibility that also facilitates reallocation of 
resources (see for example Rotemberg and 
Woodford, 2001; Bulhol et al., 2006). Product 
market reforms are also said to increase 
productive efficiency through the impact on 
incentives for workers and managers to increase 
productivity (Nickell et al., 1997; Griffith and 
Harrison, 2004). (51) 
The regression results also indicate that trade 
openness is not significantly correlated with 
resilience, contrary to the level of financial 
development, which has a negative and significant 
impact. As mentioned before this could be related 
to the fact that countries with more developed 
financial systems are more open and, hence, more 
exposed to external financial shocks (e.g. through 
portfolio and investment flows, and through the 
activities of multinational companies). The fact 
that a high level of financial development may 
facilitate the transmission of common shocks 
 
                                                        
                                                       
(50) The results reported refer to the period 1980-2008 unless 
otherwise indicated. 
(51) Ahn, S. (2002), ‘Competition, innovation and productivity 
growth: A review of theory and evidence’, OECD Economics 
Department Working Papers, No 317. 
Melitz, M. (2003), ‘The impact of trade on intra-industry 
reallocations and aggregate industry productivity’, 
Econometrica, Vol. 71, No 6, pp. 1695-1725. 
Rotemberg, J. and M. Woodford (1991), ‘Markups and the 
business cycle’, in Blanchard, O. and S. Fischer (eds.), NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual, Vol. 6. 
Boulhol, H., S. Dobbelaere, and S. Maioli (2006), ‘Imports as 
product and labour market discipline’, IZA Discussion Paper 
Series, No 2178, June. 
Nickell, S., D. Nicolitsas and N. Dryden (1997), ‘What 
makes firms perform well’, European Economic Review, Vol. 
41, pp. 783-796. 
Griffith, R. and R. Harrison (2004), ‘The link between 
product market reform and macro-economic performance’, 
European Commission Economic Paper, No 209. 
should, however, be put in perspective and 
weighed against the well-documented positive 
effect of financial deepening on growth. Finally, 
regression results also show that industrial 
sectoral output responds more to euro-area GDP 
shocks in countries that belong to EMU, 
independently of size. (52) Although this result 
seems obvious, it does not have to be. When the 
accounting bias is controlled for, the EMU 
dummy remains significant, most likely showing 
that euro-area countries are more sensitive also to 
shocks originating outside the euro area. 
Main results for countries 
Countries’ sensitivity to shocks induced by 
product market regulations (PMR), financial 
development and EMU membership is depicted in 
Graph II.3.1. It is evident that product market 
regulations play an important role in determining 
the resilience of countries. The countries that 
display a lower correlation with the euro-area 
shocks (e.g. Norway, Denmark, Hungary, the UK) 
are the ones for which the average levels of PMR 
over the sample are relatively low, meaning that 
regulatory constraints are light. In contrast, others 
that are at the bottom of the ranking (e.g. Spain, 
Greece and France) had on average relatively high 
PMR levels over the sample. These countries, 
with the exception of Greece, have nevertheless 
progressed significantly in lowering their levels of 
regulation, and this moves them up in the 
resilience scale if we consider only the most 
recent PMR levels.  
The level of financial development also emerges 
as playing a role in determining resilience. 
Countries with more developed financial markets 
such as the UK and the Netherlands, which are 
relatively well positioned in terms of product 
market regulations, move down the resilience 
scale (i.e. the marginal effect of the shock, 
independently of sectoral composition, increases) 
due, presumably, to their greater exposure to 
shocks through financial market linkages. This 
finding is consistent with related business cycle 
literature, which tends to find that financial 
integration increases business cycle 
synchronisation across countries. (53) EMU 
 
 
(52) To control for a possible accounting bias, due to the fact that 
large sectors in euro-area countries could be more correlated 
with euro-area output shocks simply because they contribute 
more to euro-area GDP, the analysis also controls for the size 
of sector and country in total euro-area production. The effect 
is, however, non-significant, indicating that such an 
accounting bias is not of much importance in the analysis. 
(53) Kose, M. A., E. S. Prasad and M. E. Terrones (2004), 
‘Volatility and Co-movement in an Integrated World 
Economy: An Exploration.’ In Macroeconomic Policies in 
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membership also seems to increase susceptibility 
to common shocks, although, on the other hand, it 
presumably reduces the occurrence of country-
specific shocks (a hypothesis not tested here, 
though). Therefore the offsetting role of vigorous 
reforms is even more important for countries in 
the euro area and for those with a high degree of 
financial development, as these two latter 
determinants increase vulnerability to common 
shocks. 
Graph II.3.1: Sensitivity to euro-area shocks — 
Contribution of key country-specific 
characteristics (1980-2008) 
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Each component’s contribution is the product of the estimated 
coefficient times the country-specific data variable (for PMR, 
financial development and EMU: ßPMRPMRj + ßFDFDj + 
ßEMUEMUj). The actual period for some countries is shorter due 
to data availability. See also Box 2.1. 
 
Source: Commission services, based on Canova et al. 
(2011). 
The ranking in Graph II.3.1 does not control for 
sectoral composition effects. When sectoral 
differences in sensitivity to shocks are accounted 
for, countries’ resilience is altered. (54) For some 
countries the effects of sectoral composition are 
substantial and lead to significant movements in 
the ranking: Germany moves down due to the 
relatively large weight of less resilient industries 
(such as manufacturing of motor vehicles). 
Conversely, in countries such as Greece and Italy, 
sectoral composition has a positive effect on 
resilience due to the predominance of relatively 
more resilient mature industries in these countries, 
particularly producing basic goods such as ‘food 
and beverages’ and ‘wearing apparel’. The sector-
specific resilience is further described in the 
subsequent section. In general, however, the effect 
of country characteristics (such as PMR) 
dominates and sectoral composition effects do not 
radically change the ranking of countries. 
                                                                                  
the World Economy, ed. H. Siebert. Artis, M. J. and T. Okubo 
(2009), ‘Globalisation and business cycle transmission’, 
North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 20.  
(54) Estimated using the sectoral dummy interactions, see Box 1. 
Main results for sectors 
Turning to the sectoral dimension, the number of 
cyclical fluctuations varies significantly across 
industry sectors. This heterogeneity could be 
attributed to asymmetric shocks (e.g. change in 
tastes), common shocks with idiosyncratic impact 
across sectors and countries (e.g. oil price shocks, 
the impact of which depends on the energy 
intensity of production) or policies at national or 
EU-wide level that are sector-specific (e.g. 
specific national industrial policies). 
Graph II.3.2: Estimated resilience of industry 
subsectors to euro-area shocks (1980-2008)(1) 
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(1) Differences in sectoral resilience identified from significant 
sectoral dummy variables. The average resilience for the EU is 
calculated using EU sector weights; sectors for which dummy 
variables were not significant have resilience equal to the 
baseline sector (chemicals and pharmaceuticals). The three 
largest subsectors are marked with the dark red bars. 
Source: Commission services, based on Canova et al. 
(2011). 
Concerning sectoral resilience to shocks, the 
commonly perceived sensitivity of the car 
industry to shocks is confirmed by the analysis 
(Graph II.3.2). This relatively low resilience is 
present also in another major euro-area 
manufacturing industry: the production of 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals. At the other 
extreme, and somehow surprisingly, mining, as 
well as wearing apparel, textile and leather 
production, which are often perceived as declining 
industries, appear to perform relatively well in the 
ranking of resilience. Clustering industrial sectors 
into intermediate goods, investment and 
consumption goods confirms that consumer goods 
sectors are more resilient, while those producing 
investment goods are less so due to more elastic 
demand. 
The focus of the analysis in this section is on 
industrial sectors. To get a sense of how industry 
compares with other economic sectors (services, 
construction, etc.), the analysis was extended to a 
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broader level of sectoral aggregation (see 
Table II.3.1, which provides the number of total 
upturns and downturns for these broad sectors, 
across all countries). The results show ‘industry’ 
displaying the lowest resilience, i.e. the highest 
correlation with euro-area common shocks, 
followed by ‘wholesale and retail trade’ and 
‘construction’. Typically non-tradable activities 
such as construction and non-financial services 
are highly domestic-oriented and have 
traditionally been sheltered from international 
competition and therefore less exposed to euro-
area common shocks. 
 
Table II.3.1: Number of identified upturns and 
downturns across broad sectors (1980-2009) 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 241
Total industry (excluding construction) 149
Construction 159
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles and personal and household goods; 
hotels and restaurants; transport, storage and 
communication
107
Financial intermediation; real estate, renting and 
business activities 89
 
Source: Commission services, based on Canova et al. 
(2011) 
 
The 2008-2009 downturn 
Data used in the analysis cover the period until 
2010Q2 and thus take only partly into account the 
effects of the ongoing crisis on sectors and 
countries across the EU. Still, it is interesting to 
see to what extent, with the information available 
at the moment of the analysis, the crisis shared 
some common characteristics with previous 
episodes. (55) 
Graph II.3.3 summarises the quarterly sectoral 
output changes during the 2008-09 downturn. 
During the recent crisis period, no industrial 
subsector faced positive growth, but there were 
                                                        
(55) A main caveat to be borne in mind, however, is that the 
methodology applied to identify turning points for this recent 
period is different and thus comparisons should be made 
carefully.  It is not possible to identify the trough that marks 
the end of the current cycle when using the methodology that 
was applied to the period 1980-2008. Instead, common 
turning points across countries are derived from the structural 
GDP shocks obtained in the VAR analysis. This rule 
identifies the peak in 2008Q1, and the trough is 2009Q1. This 
is almost identical to the peaks and troughs identified 
‘officially’ by the CEPR for Europe. This method ignores 
idiosyncrasies in the timing of the recession, but avoids a 
selection bias that would result from the exclusion of sectors 
in countries for which the end of the downturn could not be 
identified. 
 
significant differences in the magnitude of the 
retrenchment. 
Graph II.3.3: Output decline during the 2008-09 
downturn by industry subsectors, EU (in%) 
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Source: Commission services, based on Canova et al. 
(2011) 
The regression results confirm the robustness of 
results concerning product market regulation and 
the level of financial development (higher 
financial development associated with lower 
resilience). This is especially plausible for this 
period since the global downturn originated from 
a negative shock in financial markets. Contrary to 
the previous cyclical phases, the trade openness 
interaction is strongly significant and lowers 
resilience. Also for this particular cycle phase, the 
results indicate that a higher ratio of sovereign 
debt to GDP is associated with lower resilience to 
shocks. This may be explained by the fact that 
countries with higher debt levels were constrained 
in their use of fiscal policy to stabilise sectors’ 
output. High debt levels may also have deterred 
adjustment by increasing uncertainty about the 
actions that the government might take to meet its 
debt obligations, e.g. raise taxes. Countries with 
high debt to GDP ratios, such as Greece, Italy and 
Belgium, are found to exhibit higher correlations 
to common shocks, although — as before — the 
role played by product market reforms in 
offsetting this correlation is important. The 
contribution played by openness and the level of 
financial development is also large in the case of 
some countries that had relatively low debt levels 
at the beginning of the crisis (e.g. Ireland, but also 
the UK, and Switzerland) but are highly 
integrated in the global production chains or 
financial networks.  
Conclusions 
The principal lesson to be drawn from this 
analysis is that the EU countries differ in their 
degree of resilience to common shocks primarily 
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as a result of country-specific characteristics, 
among which product market regulation stands 
out as a major factor. Within the euro area in 
particular, the unequal ability of countries to 
adjust to shocks raises policy concerns as 
channels of adjustment other than the monetary 
and exchange rate channels need to work as 
smoothly as possible. 
The analysis also indicates that international 
integration — of goods and services as well as 
capital — may amplify the transmission of 
shocks. Since further advancement in integration 
seems inevitable in view of technological 
development and the irrefutable overall benefits 
of integration, it should go hand-in-hand with 
flexible functioning of product markets to 
reinforce the adjustment capacity. Thus vigorous 
reforms in product markets are particularly 
important for countries in the euro area and for 
those that are highly integrated. 
Turning to the sectoral findings, the results 
corroborate the fragility of some sectors (e.g. car 
manufacturing) as well as the higher resilience of 
consumer goods compared with investment 
goods. Given cross-country differences in the  
sectoral composition of output, this differentiated 
sectoral resilience to common shocks has an effect 
on the countries’ estimated resilience. However, 
the findings show that country-specific structural 
characteristics such as the level of product market 
regulations have a stronger impact on resilience 
than sectoral composition effects. 
The latest deep recession is a strong common 
shock that can also provide insights into which 
factors determine the differing resilience of 
countries and sectors. In particular, analysis of the 
years 2008-09 confirms that flexible and well-
functioning product markets facilitate a country’s 
adjustment capacity. However, the particular 
circumstances that triggered this recession, 
namely a banking crisis and ensuing financial 
turmoil, make it unique and drawing generalised 
conclusions becomes more difficult. 
Future studies in this area could explore the 
possibilities of extending the detailed resilience 
analysis to other sectors, such as services. For 
that, though, data at sectoral level is required, in 
particular covering characteristics such as sector-
specific product market regulations as well as 
sectoral effects of labour market policies. 
 
 
II. Special topics on the euro-area economy 
II.4. House price imbalances and 
structural features of housing 
markets  
House prices and housing markets feature 
prominently in the monitoring of macroeconomic 
imbalances in the euro area. The recently adopted 
Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP) will involve 
regular reviews of housing markets in Member 
States. (56) The EIP will be based on a scoreboard 
comprising a concise set of key macroeconomic 
variables, aimed at capturing external imbalances, 
differences in competitiveness, and internal 
imbalances. These variables will also include real 
house prices. (57)  
This section reviews the linkages between house 
prices and the rest of the economy and discusses a 
number of structural features of the housing and 
mortgage markets which are important for the 
stability of housing markets and of the broader 
macroeconomy.  
Why should macroeconomists care about 
housing markets? 
House prices are of interest for macroeconomic 
policy makers essentially for three reasons. First, 
fluctuations in house prices may have broader 
macroeconomic consequences, as house prices 
impact on the rest of the economy via wealth 
effects, fluctuations in residential construction, 
and the effects of those fluctuations on bank 
balance sheets and credit supply (see Box 1 for 
more details). Second, housing markets are 
essentially asset markets and can therefore be 
susceptible to speculation, periods of "irrational 
exuberance" and patterns of "boom and bust". 
Third, the structural features of housing markets 
(e.g. in terms of home ownership, mortgage 
market regulation and taxation) remain quite 
 
                                                        
                                                       
(56) On 15 March 2011, the (ECOFIN) Council reached a 
"general approach" on the Commission's proposal for a 
Regulation on the prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances : this paved the way for the 
trialogue discussions with the European Parliament under the 
co-decision procedure. 
(57) The indicator included in the scoreboard is the year-on-year 
change in real house prices. Although data on house price 
indices are provided by various institutions, the real estate 
market lacks a harmonized indicator fit for cross-country 
comparison. The only harmonised index is the Eurostat 
experimental house price index (HPI) which measures price 
developments of all residential properties purchased by 
households, both new and existing, independently of their 
final use and their previous owners. Only market prices are 
considered and the land component is included. The HPI 
currently covers the period 2005Q1-2010Q3 and 17 EU 
Member States. A recent Regulation on House Price Indices 
requires EU Member States to provide HPI data starting from 
2012Q2.  
heterogeneous across euro-area Member States. 
This could be an important cause of differences in 
business cycle fluctuations across countries.  
There is ample evidence of the strong cyclicality 
of house prices. In the OECD countries, during 
the period 1970-1995, the typical housing cycle 
featured 6 years of booming prices (with a 
cumulated growth of 40%) and around 5 years of 
correction (with a cumulated adjustment of 25%).  
The most recent house price cycle has been 
particularly pronounced, with an average length of 
9 years of price increases in the period preceding 
the global economic and financial recession. All 
euro-area countries except Germany, Austria, 
Portugal and Cyprus (due to the short period 
available) witnessed a cumulated growth in prices 
of over 40% during the expansion phase (see 
Table 1). However, the length and the speed of 
this expansion has shown significantly variations 
across countries, reflecting large differences in the 
structure of housing and mortgage markets, as 
well in macroeconomic conditions. 
Since the second half of 2007, euro-area housing 
markets have clearly entered a phase of 
retrenchment, with an adjustment taking place in 
most Member States and cumulated falls in house 
prices in double-digit territory in some of them 
(IE, ES, CY, SK, EE). Again, big differences 
between Member State in the speed and strength 
of the downturn were a noticeable feature.  
The large swings in house prices observed during 
the past years point to the existence of significant 
imbalances in the housing markets of some 
Member States in the years preceding the crisis. 
Measuring the magnitude of such imbalances is 
technically challenging. Housing imbalances can 
be defined in several ways, including in terms of 
(i) pronounced deviations of house prices from 
their fundamental values, or (ii) excessive house 
price volatility. While the latter can be observed 
directly, estimating the equilibrium house price is 
a more challenging task, because distinguishing 
between fundamental and non-fundamental 
sources of house price movements in real time is 
not straightforward. House price changes are 
driven by current, and expected future, 
"fundamentals" (e.g. demographic factors, 
improved productivity) or by deviations from the 
fundamentals (e.g. due to excessive credit 
provision). (58) 
 
(58) Fundamentals can also deviate from their long-term or 
equilibrium values. 
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Estimates of equilibrium house prices are usually 
accompanied by a high degree of uncertainty, 
mainly due to major endogeneity problems linked 
to identifying the contributions of supply and 
demand to the equilibrium prices. However, when 
they are interpreted with caution, estimates of 
equilibrium house prices can provide an 
indication of the magnitude of over/under-
shooting, and thereby of the magnitude of the 
potential adjustment ahead. Bearing this in mind, 
previous analytical work undertaken by the 
Commission has found that a number of euro-area 
Member States entered the global economic crisis 
with overvalued house prices, but that much of the 
misalignment now seems to have been corrected 
in the euro area. (59) However, other variables 
such as the price-to-income (affordability) ratio 
and price-to-rent ratio may point to a higher 
misalignment when current levels are compared to 
the long-term averages.  
Over the past decade, EMU and financial 
integration have resulted in greater 
synchronisation of euro-area national real estate 
markets. Nevertheless, there are still large cross-
country differences with regard to the structure of 
housing and mortgage markets, reflecting the 
diversity of regulatory, institutional, fiscal and 
financial frameworks. 
 
(59) See for instance: European Commission (2010), ‘House price 
imbalances in the euro area’, Quarterly Report on the Euro 
Area, Vol. 9 (3). 
 
 
Box II.4.1: Housing markets and the real economy
This box reviews the three main channels through which house prices can affect the macroeconomy and economic
growth. 
1) Rising real estate prices can affect household consumption spending through a wealth effect, in the form of real 
estate valuations. Some empirical analyses suggest the impact of a significant fall in real estate prices may even be 
more important than an equivalent decline in stock prices, 1 though this finding is not unchallenged. 2 
2) Rising real estate prices relative to construction costs can stimulate housing construction through higher
profitability. The reverse is true for falling house prices. A sudden decline in property prices renders investment less
attractive and reduces the profitability of the construction sector. As a result, investment may dry up and contribute to
an economic slowdown. This process is also often associated with an intersectoral substitution effect that leads to a 
re-allocation of resources between the tradable and the non-tradable construction sector. In a boom period, higher 
returns in the housing sector relative to the tradable sector attract production factors from the tradable sector and
thereby limit the supply of tradable products. In a bust period, economic adjustment towards higher production in the 
tradable sector is required, and this is often associated with low growth and high unemployment during the transition
period. Recent analysis by the European Commission supports this view of the importance of intersectoral 
substitution effects.3 
3) Booms and busts in real estate markets are often correlated with large movements in monetary and credit
aggregates with possible implications for macroeconomic imbalances and financial stability. Higher house prices
(and therefore higher valued household collateral) reduce the influence of asymmetric information between borrower
and lender and improve lending conditions. As lenders’ willingness to supply credit increases, investment and
consumer durable expenditure increases, often reinforcing the cycle through further rises in house prices and stronger 
growth in credit. Over the past decade in the euro area, this process was facilitated by international capital flows
whereby corporations as well as the household sector in several deficit countries were financing themselves abroad 
by attracting financial resources from Member States with lower investment returns. Conversely, in the bust period,
the drop in house prices reduces household collateral, contributing to write-downs and/or write-offs by banks, and 
leading to a sharp deceleration of credit flows in the economy. 
                                                          
1  Case, K., R. J. Shiller and J. M. Quigley (2001), "Comparing wealth effects: The stock market 
versus the housing market", NBER Working Papers 8606, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
2  Buiter, W. H. (2010), "Housing wealth isn't wealth", Economics — The Open-Access, Open-
Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, vol. 4(22), pp. 1-29. 
3  European Commission (2009), "Competitiveness developments in the euro area", in: Quarterly 
Report on the Euro Area, European Commission, DG ECFIN, Brussels, Vol. 8, No 1.  
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Work on the impact of these structural differences 
on housing cycles and housing imbalances 
remains limited. The rest of this section looks at 
three structural features of housing and mortgage 
markets that have been identified in a recent study 
by the Centre for European Economic Research 
(ZEW) funded by the European Commission, as 
being critical for the stability of housing 
markets. (60) These are: the structure of home 
ownership, the structure of taxation, and mortgage 
market and housing supply responses. This 
analysis is a continuation of the work being done 
by the Commission on regulatory and supervisory 
tools to limit financial instability risks associated 
with housing bubbles. (61) 
 
                                                       
(60) ZEW Study on "Housing markets and intra-euro area 
macroeconomic imbalances: Identifying policy instruments", 
mimeo. 
(61) See for instance: European Commission (2010), "Regulatory 
changes in the financial sector and the prevention of housing 
bubbles", Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 9 No. 4. 
Home ownership and rental markets 
Ownership structures differ widely between euro-
area countries. Home ownership rates are 
particularly high in Spain, Ireland, Greece, and 
Italy and comparatively low in Germany. An 
increase in home ownership rates can be observed 
in most euro-area countries, and this increase is 
particularly pronounced in Spain. Andrews et al. 
(2011) find that the increase in the share of owner 
occupied housing during the past few decades in 
most OECD countries is only partially explained 
by changes in household characteristics, such as 
population ageing. (62) They further find that 
policy factors such as taxation incentives and 
rental regulation have played a role in influencing 
households' choice of tenure.  
The empirical analysis in the aforementioned 
ZEW study finds that the change in the 
 
(62) Andrews, D., A. Caldera Sanchez and A. Johansson (2011), 
"Housing markets and structural policies in OECD 
countries", OECD Economics Department Working papers, 
No. 836, OECD Publishing. 
 
Table II.4.1: Real House Price growth (in %) (1) 
Year-on-year Cumulative Growth Average growth rate Cumulative Adjustment Data source
2007 2008 2009 2010
BE 4.5 0.5 -1.0 0.6 [95Q2-07Q3] 84 5.0 [07Q3-10Q4] -1 ESTAT/ECB
DE -0.4 -1.0 0.0 0.7 [08Q4-97Q1] 3 2.7 [08Q4-10Q4] -15 OECD
IE 4.1 -10.1 -16.0 -9.9 [97Q2-07Q1] 172 10.1 [07Q1-11Q1] -38 ESTAT/OECD
EL 1.7 0.6 0.3 -5.9 [00Q1-07Q3] 61 6.4 [07Q3-11Q1] -14 ESTAT/OECD
ES 6.4 -4.9 -7.2 -4.2 [95Q4-07Q3] 155 8.0 [07Q3-11Q1] -22 ESTAT/OECD
FR 4.5 -1.3 -7.2 5.0 [96Q2-07Q4] 110 6.5 [07Q4-11Q1] -1 OECD
IT 3.1 -0.6 -1.0 -1.3 [99Q4-07Q3] 43 4.7 [99Q4-07Q3] -10 ECB
CY 9.4 1.1 -7.3 -7.5 [05Q2-08Q1] 27 8.9 [08Q1-10Q4] -21 ESTAT/ECB
LU 6.9 0.2 -3.6 2.7 [95Q2-08Q2] 129 6.4 [08Q2-10Q4] -2 ESTAT/ECB
MT 19.3 7.0 -6.4 -1.5 [01Q2-08Q3] 157 13.2 [08Q3-10Q3] -11 ESTAT/ECB
NL 2.7 0.2 -4.9 -2.9 [90Q4-08Q3] 152 5.3 [08Q3-11Q1] -11 ESTAT/OECD
AT 1.5 -1.3 3.4 0.7 [04Q3-07Q2] 11 3.9 [07Q2-11Q1] 1 ESTAT/ECB
PT -1.6 1.3 1.7 0.7 [07Q4-10Q1] 7 3.1 [10Q1-11Q1] -2 ECB
SI 18.5 -2.3 -8.7 0.7 [03Q2-08Q1] 76 12.0 [08Q1-11Q1] -10 ECB
SK 14.1 5.6 -16.0 -4.5 [05Q1-08Q1] 43 12.1 [08Q1-11Q1] -29 ESTAT/ECB
FI 1.8 -1.8 -2.1 7.0 [01Q3-08Q2] 34 4.4 [08Q2-11Q1] 2 ESTAT/OECD
BG 18.6 15.2 -23.1 -10.8 [02Q2-08Q3] 225 17.3 [08Q3-11Q1] -39 ESTAT/BIS
CZ 6.6 -4.8 1.3 -8.5 [05Q4-09Q1] 13 3.7 [09Q1-10Q3] -17 ESTAT/BIS
DK 0.8 -8.2 -13.9 0.4 [93Q2-06Q3] 176 7.7 [06Q3-10Q4] -22 ESTAT/OECD
EE 5.3 -21.6 -34.8 -1.1 [03Q3-07Q2] 153 25.5 [07Q2-11Q1] -54 ECB
LV 34.0 -30.6 -30.3 -4.8 [06Q1-07Q4] 81 35.4 [07Q4-11Q1] -53 BIS
LT 28.0 0.2 -32.9 -13.0 [00Q3-08Q1] 417 22.5 [08Q1-11Q1] -46 BIS
HU -8.8 -3.2 10.7 -7.8 [02Q4-09Q1] 19 2.8 [09Q1-11Q1] -15 ESTAT/BIS
PL 126.3 -44.2 114.2 [08Q3-09Q4] 174 89.4 [09Q4-09Q4] BIS
SE 7.8 3.9 10.9 -4.7 [96Q3-09Q4] 172 7.6 [09Q4-11Q1] -12 ESTAT/OECD
UK 8.3 11 2 -0.1 [98Q1-09Q4] 162 8.3 [09Q4-11Q1] -9 ESTAT/OECD
Trough to peak (2) Peak to latest data
(1) For 2010, the latest available quarterly data point provided by Eurostat is Q3. First data point: 2001 (MT, AT), 2004 (SI), 2005 (EE), 
2006 (CY). The deflator used is the consumer deflator: Household and NPISH final consumption expenditure (P31_S14_S15). 
(2) The peaks and troughs identification is done following a [-6, +6] quarters window, following Rousová and Van den Noord (2011), 
"Predicting Peaks and Troughs in Real House Prices", OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 882. 
Source: Commission services.  
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homeownership rate is a key variable in 
explaining the volatility of house prices. Increases 
in the homeownership rate have a strong positive 
effect on the volatility of house prices. Given this 
result, the often-expressed political goal of 
increasing home ownership rates might conflict 
with the goal of stable housing markets 
characterised by low price volatility. Reasoning 
along these lines, subsidies or tax incentives for 
home owners may come at the cost of lower 
market stability.  
Graph II.4.1: Residential mobility vs. owner 
occupation rates (in %, 2007) (1) 
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(1) Residential mobility is measured by the share of households 
that moved within the year.  
Source: ZEW. 
 
Price volatility may not be the only negative 
consequence of high ownership rates. Given that 
home owners are less mobile than renters, high 
rates of ownership can also have major 
implications for residential and labour mobility. A 
home owner is estimated to be 11% less likely to 
move than a home renter. (63) Low residential 
mobility is typically found in countries where 
owner occupation rates are high, as owners 
typically face higher transactions costs for moving 
than households that live in rented houses. This 
can be clearly seen in Graph II.4.1, which shows a 
negative relationship between owner occupation 
rates and residential mobility, measured as the 
percentage of households that changed residence 
within the last two years. 
Another finding of the ZEW study is that 
ownership structures and the supply of social 
housing are important for macroeconomic 
stability. A higher share of low income 
homeowners is positively related to house price 
growth and the occurrence of house price 
imbalances, whereas the share of social housing 
has a negative relationship with imbalances. The 
                                                        
(63) Andrews et al. (2011), op. cit.  
possible policy implications of this finding 
depend on the drivers of homeownership among 
low income households. If low income 
households are more or less forced to become 
homeowners because of the lack of alternatives 
(i.e. the rental market is not well established and 
there are no adequate social housing 
opportunities), reducing the occurrence of housing 
imbalances involves fostering a stable and 
properly functioning rental market. However, if 
tax incentives and subsidies, as well as the 
availability of mortgages with variable interest 
rates, are the main driving forces for low income 
households to become homeowners, the policy 
response should involve changes in the taxation 
system as well as mortgage market conditions. 
Graph II.4.2: Low income owners and real house 
price growth 
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Graph II.4.3: Rent control and real house price 
growth (1) 
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(1) Rent control is measured with an OECD composite indicator 
combining data on the extent of rent controls, on how increases in 
rents are determined and on the permitted cost pass-through onto 
rents. 
Source: ZEW. 
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Mortgage market structures and tax incentives 
ZEW's analysis also shows that both house prices 
and credit volumes are higher in countries where 
variable interest rates are common (e.g. ES, UK) 
compared to countries where mortgage contracts 
with fixed interest rates prevail (e.g. DE). 
Moreover, the impact of credit growth on house 
price growth seems to be amplified in countries 
with variable interest rate settings and/or where 
mortgage interest is tax deductible. Also, housing 
markets are more volatile if mortgages with 
variable interest rates are dominant. This could 
provide an additional argument for housing policy 
to support long-term finance with fixed rates, 
particularly so as to avoid myopic behaviour of 
households which might lead to repayment 
difficulties further down the line. 
These results are in keeping with those of a 
number of previous studies which have identified 
some key structural sources of housing instability. 
Almeida et al. (2006) find that the sensitivity of 
house prices and mortgage demand to income 
shocks is higher in countries where loan-to-value 
ratios are higher, i.e. in countries where 
households are on average less credit-
constrained. (64) Similarly, Calza et al. (2009) 
conclude that more developed mortgage markets 
tend to magnify the impact of monetary policy 
shocks on house prices, residential investment and 
consumption. (65)  
Personal income and property taxation systems 
may also provide incentives or deterrents to 
potential homebuyers. The difference between the 
market interest rate and the financing cost of 
housing, also known as the tax wedge, has a 
strong positive correlation with house price 
volatility (Van Den Noord, 2005). (66) A high 
inflation environment also tends to reduce real 
after-tax mortgage interest rates.  
Taxes and subsidies consist of a wide range of 
different types of taxes and subsidies, the main 
ones being: mortgage rate deductibility, tax on 
imputed rents, capital gains tax, recurrent taxes on 
land and buildings, wealth taxes, inheritance tax, 
value added tax (VAT), and stamp duties. 
 
                                                        
                                                       
(64) Almeida, H., M. Campello and C. Liu (2006), "The financial 
accelerator: Evidence from the international housing 
markets" Review of Finance 10 (3), pp 321–352.  
(65) Calza, A., Monacelli, T. and L. Stracca (2009): "Housing 
finance and monetary policy", ECB Working Paper No. 1069. 
(66) Van Den Noord, P. (2005), “Tax Incentives and house price 
volatility in the euro area: Theory and evidence”, Économie 
Internationale, Vol. 101 (2005), pp. 29-45. 
Subsidies are often limited to first-time buyers 
and depend on income or the value of the house. 
Supply responses  
A third important structural feature that affects 
housing market imbalances is the flexibility/price 
elasticity of housing supply. The responsiveness 
of supply to changes in prices plays an important 
role in shaping house price developments. A 
responsive housing supply reduces house price 
volatility, but potentially at the expense of greater 
fluctuations in residential investment, with the net 
impact on overall economic activity being 
unclear. (67) Thus, it seems that during boom 
periods, inelastic housing supply reinforces house 
price overvaluation, while high supply elasticity 
coupled with expectations of future housing price 
rises may lead to overshooting in construction 
activity.  
Both cases raise specific policy problems in both 
the upswing phase and the adjustment phase. 
Under inelastic supply, house prices may increase 
more in the boom period, involving a drop in 
affordability with negative distributional effects. 
During the downturn, less adjustment is needed 
on the supply side as shifts in labour resources 
from the rest of the economy to the construction 
sector were limited during the boom period. At 
the same time, in a rigid supply environment, 
price decreases may be more dramatic, with 
potential strong spillover effects on private 
consumption (via wealth effects) as well as on 
bank balance sheets (via reduced collateral values 
and higher rates of delinquency). 
Under elastic supply, demand pressures on prices 
tend to be more cushioned in the upswing. (68) 
However, a strong response by supply during 
boom years may raise serious issues both in terms 
of diverting productive resources from the 
tradable sector and by leaving a large excess 
housing stock in the early stage of the downturn.  
Even though supply is rather inelastic in the short 
term, it is fairly elastic in the longer term, but with 
big differences across EU Member States related 
 
(67) Andrews, D., A. Caldera Sanchez and A. Johansson (2011), 
"Housing markets and structural policies in OECD 
countries", OECD Economics Department Working papers, 
No. 836. 
(68) While new housing units may well be built in order to take 
advantage of profit opportunities during a demand boom, it 
would seem entirely irrational for housing units to be 
destroyed due to price falls. Non-residential land use is the 
main alternative use, but land prices tend to follow house 
prices. Furthermore, there is no market for second-hand 
building materials. 
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in part to planning restrictions. (69) Therefore, the 
adjustment needs that follow protracted boom 
phases tend to be greater, as the adjustment to a 
large oversupply in the housing stock is likely to 
be painful both for real estate companies and for 
construction workers who need to find a job in 
another sector.  
Conclusion 
The financial crisis has revealed the need to 
reconsider policy objectives for housing markets. 
Guaranteeing a socially acceptable minimum 
standard of housing for all, addressing market 
failures and ensuring that housing markets do not 
lead to a build-up of imbalances with detrimental 
consequences for macroeconomic stability might 
prove to be challenging and sometimes 
contradictory objectives.  
 
(69) The main issues surrounding housing supply dynamics are 
explored using the example of the UK in Kuenzel, R. and B. 
Bjørnbak (2008), "The UK Housing market: Anatomy of a 
house price boom",  ECFIN Country Focus Vol. 5 Issue 11: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication
13282_en.pdf 
Several considerations are to be assessed against 
the specificity of national housing market 
systems. First, because of their potentially 
negative impact on house price stability, it is 
important to weigh carefully incentives for 
increased housing ownership, especially for low-
income households. Establishing well-functioning 
rental markets as well as other housing 
opportunities (e.g. shared ownership) for lower 
income households may prove to be a viable 
alternative. Secondly, variable mortgage interest 
rates, high loan-to-value ratios and tax incentives 
for house purchase seem to increase the risk of 
imbalances in housing markets. Finally, more 
analysis is needed on the supply side of housing in 
order to better understand the overall impact of 
supply flexibility on macroeconomic stability. 
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